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ABSTRACT 
 
Bringing more agricultural land into production for biofuels and food crops will 
be necessary if we are to both fulfill our collective climate initiative goals and feed an 
increasing global population. The direct competition between land for food and land for 
biofuels has resulted in increased interest in identifying ‘marginal lands’ such that 
biofuels can be grown on land that does not threaten the food security of poor, rural 
communities. The term ‘marginal land’ is also used by developing state governments to 
describe large swaths of land being leased to private or state-affiliated investors in what 
has been referred to by the international research community as the ‘global land grab’. 
‘Marginal land’, however, is defined and operationalized differently across users and 
anecdotal evidence shows that some lands classified as marginal are actually used by 
local communities. Empirical studies investigating these contested lands have not 
incorporated spatial information. The main objective of this thesis is to conduct a multi-
scalar, spatially-explicit exploration of the marginal lands narrative. The first chapter 
investigates the ontology of the marginal land label as it is applied on a global/regional 
	   viii 
scale using a meta-analysis of four recent studies. The second chapter triangulates 
national-level geospatial information with information from semi-structured interviews to 
examine marginal lands allocated to Ethiopia’s federal land bank as contested spaces. 
The third chapter uses a statistical analysis to identify the socio-political and biophysical 
determinants of banked lands on a subnational scale in Benishangul–Gumuz, Ethiopia. 
Results show that methods using remotely sensed information to identify marginal lands 
on a global/regional scale are qualitatively and quantitatively divergent and are limited in 
their usefulness in identifying available land for biofuels. The Ethiopia case study finds 
that the federal government is banking ‘marginal land’ for future investment that is more 
appropriately understood as ‘land unused for commercial agriculture’ and that they are 
contested spaces where the federal government stands to incur multiple benefits through 
their transformation to large-scale agriculture. I also find both biophysical and socio-
political factors (i.e. ethnicity, agricultural practices) guide the federal government’s 
decision regarding which land to target in the subnational region of Benishangul-Gumuz. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 	  
1.1 Background and rationale 	  
 The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) projects that we, as a global 
society, will need to bring an additional 280 million hectares (Mha) into agricultural 
production by 2030 for expanded food production in order to satisfy burgeoning middle 
class appetites and an increasing global population (Wirsenius et al. 2010). This is in 
addition to the estimated 500 Mha that will be required by 2020 to meet biofuel 
objectives that will potentially require up to 20% of all arable land by 2050 (Liversage 
2010; Gallagher 2008).  
These anticipated demands in conjunction with other commercial pressures on 
land constitute the underpinning drivers of what is being referred to as the ‘global land 
rush’ or ‘global land grab’. These terms can be broadly defined as the rapid change in 
land use rights and land use patterns as a result of the buying or leasing of large pieces of 
land in developing countries for food or biofuel projects on behalf of state-affiliated or 
private investors  (Borras et al. 2011; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 
2009). While foreign direct investment (FDI) to agriculture in the form of agricultural 
extensification is not new, the size, scale, and speed of these transfers since the dual 
fuel/food crisis of 2007/2008 have marked the onset of a new phase that warrants being 
distinguished within the longer-term historical processes of economic and social 
transformation in rural societies (Anseeuw et al. 2012). 
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Many of the states hosting these land deals have chronically food insecure 
populations that rely on their land directly for survival. It is in this context that we find an 
increased interest in identifying ‘marginal land’—a term generally used to refer to land 
with varying degrees of agricultural potential yet, currently unused in an attempt to avoid 
the displacement of communities or impacting food security in developing countries (Cai 
et al. 2011; Deninger 2011; Nijsen et al. 2011; Milbrandt and Overend 2009; Campbell et 
al. 2008; Field et al. 2008).  
For example, in an energy policy context, remote sensing and other geospatial 
data have been applied to isolate ‘marginal land’ that would be suitable for bioenergy 
crops but are unused so do not pose a threat to food production (see Cai et al. 2011; 
Nijsen et al. 2011; Milbrandt and Overend 2009; Campbell et al. 2008; Field et al. 2008).   
States that are hosting large-scale land acquisitions for agriculture are also  
categorizing and setting aside land that they refer to as ‘marginal’, ‘barren’, ‘unused’, or  
‘wasteland’(Borras et al. 2011). These areas are identified and promoted ostensibly for 
the purpose of reaping the perceived benefits that come with these investments including 
technology transfer and foreign exchange earnings. Ethiopia, for example, has delineated 
approximately 3.6 Mha of what the government refers to as ‘marginal’ or ‘wasteland’ to 
be leased to foreign and domestic investors to produce food and biofuel crops mainly for 
export (Fisseha 2011; Rahmato 2011).   
The terms (i.e. marginal, wasteland etc.) are prone to conceptual drift, however, 
and can be operationalized in very different ways depending on the context within which 
they are applied. Literature featuring the concept of marginal land has spanned a variety 
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of disciplines including rural studies and political ecology and includes discussions in 
development and environment, agricultural development and agricultural economics. A 
commonly explored theme is the complex relationships existing between poverty and the 
degradation of vulnerable or fragile lands (CGIAR TAC 2000). In the context of 
identifying land for agricultural expansion, it seems that many areas labeled marginal 
(and thus suitable for investment) are not vulnerable, degraded or fragile lands.  Studies 
show that whether identified through remote sensing techniques or categorized more 
colloquially, many of these so-called marginal areas are being productively used by local 
communities for a wide variety of purposes such as shifting agriculture, pastoralism, 
subsistence farming, hunting and gathering, and for the harvesting of building materials 
and medicinal plants (Borras et al. 2011; Baka 2011, Píñar 2009; Demeke and Akilu 
2008). On these lands we find healthy forests, active croplands, and pastures (Fritz et al. 
2012). Evidence from these studies suggest that in these marginal areas, alternative land 
uses are either overlooked as a function of the technique used to identify them, or that 
they are deliberately devalued in the quest for conversion to large-scale agriculture.   
The quality of these so-called marginal lands and the human-environment 
interactions endemic to them has been investigated almost exclusively through local, 
ethnographically grounded studies. Examining the identification and allocation of 
marginal land for commercial agriculture from a broader perspective has been largely 
neglected due to a lack of precise spatial information on targeted lands. Though these 
intensive field studies can contribute to our understanding of political economy of large-
scale land acquisitions, results are limited in that they cannot necessarily be ‘scaled up’ to 
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examine binding characteristics of what sets these areas apart from others and what 
specifically, might render lands investable and deserving of the labels applied to them. 
Results cannot be extrapolated to elucidate any broader trends regarding how these deals 
might change agrarian landscapes and societies within the country.  
 
1.2 Thesis overview 
 
My dissertation research builds on these case studies by taking the determination 
of marginality as a subject of direct study with the guiding question: How is the marginal 
land label defined and applied to identify land for agricultural investment and 
extensification in the context of the ‘global land rush’? Using newly available geospatial 
information and principles from spatial statistics and qualitative research methods, I 
explore the classification and ontology of ‘marginal land’ on global/regional, national and 
sub-national scales. My goal is to explore how this label relates to issues of 
power/disempowerment between groups, patterns in land appropriation, land use change 
and state-making using the case study of Ethiopia (Figure 1.1). The underlying 
hytpothesis is that investigating narratives of marginality and how decision-makers apply 
them will provide clues about areas that will be impacted by conversion to commercial 
agriculture, and how these changes may affect politically and economically marginalized 
peoples and the landscapes they inhabit.  Specifically, my research objectives are to: 
• Examine how geospatial technologies are being used to identify marginal land 
suitable for biofuel development on a global or regional scale (Chapter 2) 
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• Identify areas in the Ethiopian federal land bank (land designated for future 
investment) to explore alternative land uses and the role of the ‘marginal lands’ narrative 
in state-making (Chapter 3) 
• Identify socio-political, demographic, biophysical and situational features that 
increase the likelihood that land is placed into the federal land bank for conversion into 
large-scale agriculture in the Ethiopian region of Benishangul Gumuz (BGRS) (Chapter 
4). 
 
Figure 1.1  Thesis overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How is the marginal 
land label defined 
and applied in the 
context of identifying 
land for agricultural     
investment? 
• qualitative meta-
analysis of studies 
identifying marginal 
lands for biofuels on a 
macro scale 
• quantitative analysis 
identifying factors 
determining lands set 
aside for investment 
in BGRS, Ethiopia 
• qualitative 
investigation of 
marginal lands, 
contested land uses, 
and state-making 
     in Ethiopia  
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Chapter 2  
Marginal lands: the role of remote sensing in constructing landscapes for agrofuel 
development 
Nalepa, R.A. and D.M. Bauer. 2012. Marginal lands: the role of remote sensing in 
constructing landscapes for agrofuel development, Journal of Peasant Studies, 39(2), 403-
422. [DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2012.665890] 
 
2.1 Introduction 	  
The continued promotion of agrofuel as a partial solution to the world’s carbon problem 
has brought with it the prerogative to expand agricultural land dedicated to the cultivation 
of bioenergy crops. Governments in many developing countries are brokering 
international agrofuel agreements and facilitating land deals to enable transnational 
corporations to gain access to land in order to produce bioenergy feedstock for export 
(Borras Jr. and Franco 2010). To this end, questions have been raised about the risks to 
rural livelihoods and the serious abuses of the land rights and human rights of 
smallholder farmers and others with insecure or non-existent land tenure (Anseeuw 
2012). Also looming large is the question of whether it is ethically acceptable to support 
the commercial cultivation of fuel crops in countries that face chronic food deficit. 
To circumvent the food versus fuel debate as well as address some of the concerns 
over the potential adverse effects on smallholders due to the expansion of energy crops, it 
has been suggested that agrofuels be dedicated only to what are being referred to as 
‘marginal lands’. For example, according to a report issued by the Renewable Fuels 
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Agency, an independent sustainable fuels regulator commissioned by the UK 
government, agrofuel policies should ensure that agricultural expansion is ‘directed 
towards suitable idle or marginal land, or utilizes appropriate wastes, residues or other 
non-crop feedstock’ (Gallagher 2008). Developing states also have an incentive to 
propagate what is referred to as the ‘marginal lands narrative’; by promoting the notion 
that unused agricultural land exists within their borders to the international community, 
states open their doors to the economic opportunities that may come with the harnessing 
of this ‘new’ natural resource. 
What is meant by ‘marginal land’, however, is not precisely known. It is not 
uncommon in studies discussing the energy potentials of various agrofuel crops for 
authors to acknowledge food security concerns by making a passing statement that only 
marginal or degraded lands should be used for biomass cultivation without explicitly 
defining the term. In their study attempting to estimate the extent of marginal lands in 19 
countries, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) points out that, indeed, the 
term seems to be used ‘quite loosely’ and ‘without definition’ (Milbrandt and Overend 
2009). To complicate matters further, states often use their own nuanced language to 
refer to land with agrofuel potentialities that are, of course, relative and not linked to any 
broader standardized definition. Terms used may include degraded, abandoned, idle or 
wasteland, among others (Tang et al. 2010; Wiegmann et al.  2008;). 
Recent research grappling with defining these lands relies on geospatial 
technology such as remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems (GIS) in 
combination with other global or national datasets to identify land that is both unsuitable 
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for commercially competitive food crops and also available or unused for other 
productive purposes. The use of spatial data to classify ‘under-utilized’ land is not new 
and there is a rich history of academic discourse documenting how land classifications 
have been used as a tool to negotiate power relationships in resource politics or to assert 
state hegemony (see Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010; Robbins 2003; Robbins and Maddock 
2000; Brara 1992). 
What distinguishes recent attempts to classify marginal land is the intensified 
effort to use modern geospatial technology to identify marginal lands on a regional or 
global scale. The need to stake a claim for land for the production of bioenergy crops in 
the face of rising commercial pressures on land resulting from competing uses 
(urbanization, nature preservation, etc.) has raised interest in formally operationalizing 
a separate category of land; ‘marginal lands’ must first be uniformly identified and 
quantified in order to be framed as a potential global economic resource. 
This paper contrasts four recent studies that attempt to quantify marginal lands on 
large geographic scales in order to demonstrate the serious limitations of modern 
geospatial technologies in determining the availability of these lands. First, people often 
have intentions behind land use that are not reflected in land cover/use data. Second, a 
remote (and spatio-temporally static) characterization of marginality is unable to capture 
the shifting character of what constitutes marginality in an economic sense and is, 
therefore, a non-sequitur for guiding land use decisions on the ground. For these reasons, 
this paper questions not only the value of creating a macro-scale ‘marginal lands’ 
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classification, but the very propriety of applying its application in the resolution of the 
‘food vs. fuel’ debate. 
This paper also explores the latent values embedded in the ontology of a macro- 
scale ‘marginal land’ land cover class. Here, I posit that its creation reflects a 
continued bias toward resource productivism through categorizing world spaces by their 
potential to be accumulated and commoditized for the ‘global good’ and feeds the 
collective northern imagination that there is still surplus land yet undefined by endemic 
socio-ecological relationships waiting to be commoditized for agrofuels. Also examined 
is the potential role of a marginal lands classification in legitimizing land deal politics on 
a national or subnational level through the appropriation of language from these scientific 
(and, therefore, seemingly objective and non-political) models. 
This is a particularly salient discourse. Users of these marginal lands estimations 
may be unaware of their origins and limitations and, therefore, employing them in 
inappropriate contexts and producers in the remote sensing community may be focusing 
too much on technical issues (how do we produce something?) and not enough on 
ontological issues (what are we trying to produce?) (Comber et al.  2005). This research 
is the beginning of a larger effort to examine the use of tools such as remote sensing and 
GIS in the appropriation of nature in this context of ‘green grabs’ as well as to situate the 
role of physical science in relationship to other analytical frameworks already being 
applied to examine the current phenomenon of large-scale land transfers, including 
approaches in political ecology, political economy and sociology. 
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2.2 Agrofuels and rising commercial pressures on land 
 
 In the mid-2000s, optimism ran high regarding the potential of agrofuels to 
redress a host of global concerns such as greenhouse gas emissions, energy security and 
rural development (Gallagher 2008). Since that time, however, concerns have been raised 
that large-scale agrofuel projects may have adverse environmental, social and economic 
impacts. On the environmental front, these include water stress and soil erosion as well as 
concerns that upon complete life cycle analysis, agrofuels may only compound the 
problem they are ostensibly intended to ameliorate: namely carbon debt (Fargione et al.  
2008; Scharlemann and Laurance 2008). The food-fuel crisis of 2007–08 also sparked 
speculation about the contribution of agrofuels’ expansion to soaring food prices. During 
this time, the term, ‘global land-grabbing’, emerged to refer to reports that large parcels 
of arable land were being transferred between private investors (and, in some cases, 
sovereign states) often in an ad hoc, nontransparent and sometimes legally questionable 
manner. In light of these facts, original claims that agrofuels were the answer to 
jumpstarting stagnating rural economies began to be seriously questioned as the social 
costs of these projects became apparent, including the displacement and lost livelihoods 
of small farmers and other vulnerable populations in countries characterized by insecure 
land tenure rights and poor governance (Deininger et al. 2011; Cotula et al. 2008). Many 
projects ended up experiencing delays or being shelved due to lower oil prices and the 
fervor around agrofuels seemed to have abated.  
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Despite a decidedly more cynical approach on the part of many investors, 
governments and policy organizations, agrofuels still very much remain part of the 
portfolio of assumed solutions to the carbon problem and the expansion of agricultural 
land dedicated to this purpose is imminent. For example, though the UK dropped its 
initial objective to raise the percentage contribution of agrofuels to the country’s fuel mix 
to 10 percent by 2020 in response to concerns over potential impacts on food prices, it 
simply does not have the land resources to meet this goal through domestic production 
alone (Gallagher 2008). Part of the persistence of agrofuels may be due to the momentum 
established in the wake of this last crisis – a period characterized by the establishment of 
increasingly sophisticated and intricate corporate-state arrangements referred to as the 
‘emergent biofuel complex’. This complex serves agricultural and energy industries faced 
with the pressure of rising costs and thinner profit margins and shows little signs of 
slowing down (Borras Jr. et al.  2010; Dauvergne and Neville 2010). 
So, while only 14 Mha (1–2 percent of the world’s arable land) is currently  
 
devoted to bioenergy crops, a mid-range estimate of an additional 500 Mha will 
 
be required by 2020 to meet agrofuel objectives and could potentially require up to 20 
 
percent of all arable land by 2050 (Liversage 2010; Gallagher 2008). This is in addition  
 
to the 280 Mha that the FAO projects will  be required by 2030 for expanded  food  
 
production in order to satisfy burgeoning middle  class appetites and an increasing  
 
global population (Wirsenius et al.  2010). Prices also matter; economic models indicate  
 
that a modest US $20/ton carbon tax in combination  with improved technology for the  
 
production and processing of cellulosic biomass could  lead to a massive conversion of  
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farmland from food production and grazing lands to  cultivating fuel crops (Field et al.   
 
2008). Though demand forecasts are subject to a considerable amount of uncertainty due  
 
to the sheer number of socioeconomic and  biophysical parameters involved (the  
 
aforementioned model generated by Wirsenius and  colleagues contained 1,700  
 
parameters and 170 physical flows for each discrete  geographical region described), it is  
 
enough to know that even if a significant portion of  land dedicated to food production  
 
could simultaneously produce second-generation (lignocellulosic) agrofuels, some extent  
 
of agricultural expansion will be necessary if we are to meet our demands for both food  
 
and fuel. The question becomes: Where is this surplus land to be found and how can it be  
 
identified? 
 
 
2.3  Solutions to scarcity: from ‘surplus’ to ‘marginal’ land 	  
Databases that formed the basis of subsequent cultivable land inventories were 
  
created in the 1970s. They were then brought together in the 1980s to create some of the 
 
first global scale assessments and have continued to evolve since that time (Young 1999).  
 
Currently, remote sensing and spatial tools such as GIS are the means by which land is  
 
being classified, characterized and assessed for its biophysical fitness (or lack thereof) in  
 
supporting commercial agriculture on a global level. For example, the International  
 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), along with the FAO, has been  
 
instrumental in developing the contemporary incarnation of what are referred to as Agro- 
 
Ecological Zones (AEZ), a standardized framework for characterizing climate, soil,   
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terrain and other biophysical conditions relevant to agricultural production based on a  
 
combination of global datasets. Building on this framework, the World Bank recently  
 
concluded that the amount of remaining arable or ‘surplus land’ that is uncultivated, not  
 
forested, and with population densities of less than 25 persons per square kilometer (km2)  
 
that could be dedicated to the five rain-fed crops of sugarcane, wheat, maize, oil palm and  
 
soybean is estimated at roughly 445 Mha2  (Deininger et al.  2011). Most of this land is  
 
distributed among a small handful of lesser-developed countries and some transition  
 
economies, with Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America ranking at the top of the list  
 
(Deininger et al. 2011).  
 
The concept of ‘surplus land’ (also referred to as ‘land reserve’, ‘available land’  
 
or ‘land balance’) carries with it a sort of reassurance that there will be plenty of land to 
 
meet future global demands (Young 1999). This has become a problematic concept for a 
 
couple reasons. First, it violates the principle of Ricardian rent, one of the most   
 
established in economic theory. This principle dictates that the best land will be used first  
 
since its cultivation relative to poorer quality land results in lower production costs and  
 
higher yields. Policy and socioeconomic factors, of course, may alter land use decisions  
 
and land productivity, but Ricardian rent assumes that land quality is an inherent and 
 
quasi-permanent characteristic that will render certain areas better suited for agriculture  
 
than others. Put simply, if there were the amount of quality surplus land that some  
 
estimates claim, farming on poorer quality soils would not exist to the extent that it does. 
 
Empirical regional validation strengthens this supposition. In contrast to models  
 
that have predicted a cultivable lands balance, the reality reported from researchers doing 
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fieldwork and ethnographically grounded studies paints a vastly different picture (Young  
 
1999). For example, a 1998 FAO/IIASA global ‘land balance’ study claimed the percent  
 
of cultivated land to total cultivable land was 43:57 in Malawi and 45:55 in Ethiopia  
 
(Young 1999; Fischer and Heilig 1998). Aerial photographs capturing the entirety of  
 
Malawi over the years spanning 1958–62 had already told a very different story,  
 
however. These older images revealed the more fertile regions of the country to be 100  
 
percent cultivated, along with some lesser quality land fallowing on long rotations. 
 
Roughly 15 years later, the population had grown from three to five million and  
 
cultivation had crept up the hillsides and agriculture had extended further onto less  
 
suitable lands. A similarly competitive agricultural situation was also observed in  
 
Ethiopia during this time period (Young 1999). 
 
Even if contemporary surplus land estimates such as the aforementioned World 
 
Bank assessment acknowledge that there is much less land available in these countries  
 
now, these numbers might still be overestimated. Land reported as ‘surplus’ may be  
 
based on unreliable national statistics derived under excessive optimism that biophysical 
 
constraints such as poor or dry soils could be overcome with inputs such as fertilizer or  
 
improved irrigation. Fallow land may have also unknowingly been included in estimates  
 
at the time of surveying. Moreover, it is generally unknown how much of this identified  
 
surplus land is cost-effective to develop – it may be prohibitively far from markets,  
 
located in malaria-ridden lowlands or contaminated through mining activities. These are  
 
just a few examples of specific circumstances that may complicate estimates when the  
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viability of these land parcels is actually evaluated in situ. 
 
This is not a trivial matter since, according to an analysis by the World Bank, the 
perceived availability of cultivable land appears to be one of the most important factors in 
determining the probability of being a destination country for large-scale land acquisition 
and many countries seeking investment tout the existence of surplus land within their 
borders. For example, the government of Mozambique has stated that only 9 percent of 
the county’s arable land is currently in use and, in 2009, Reuters quoted the Zambian 
Agriculture Minister, Brian Chituwo, as saying that Zambia was using less than 15 
percent of its land and that more than 30 Mha were ‘begging to be utilised [sic]’ 
(Tostevin 2009; Cotula et al. 2008). The 2010 Annual World Bank Conference on Land 
Administration and Policy seemed to serve as much as a platform for many states’ 
representatives to advertise the availability of cultivable land (while downplaying social 
and environmental assessments) as to discuss some of the major concerns with the scale 
and speed of recent land transfers. 
The latest trend of transnational investments, predicated largely upon the 
presumed availability of surplus cultivable land, has troubling implications. Investors 
bringing more land into agricultural production will increase competition for either 
additional fertile land or land that suddenly becomes cost-effective to farm due to 
irrigation projects or other technological improvements. There is a possibility that local 
food farmers will be pushed farther onto lower quality land with any remaining favored 
land being awarded to investors. This not only poses a potential threat to rural 
livelihoods, but also has implications for food security. An estimated 37 percent of land 
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conceded globally over the last couple of years has been destined for agrofuel projects 
with European investors having already acquired more than five Mha of (mostly fertile) 
land across the Global South (Anseeuw 2012; Borras Jr. et al. 2010). The destinations of 
these investments are often food insecure regions, raising concerns that fertile land is 
being diverted to fuel crops. For example, countries such as Sudan, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Madagascar and Zambia all have a prevalence of 
undernourishment that is between 22 percent and 69 percent, yet have been targets for 
agrofuel investment (FAO 2010a). 
Decreasing or non-existent remaining, sustainably cultivable land along with 
evidence that agriculture for fuel and agriculture for food will directly compete with one 
another has created the need to evolve from the surplus land narrative. This becomes a 
sticking point for the biofuel complex and it is explicitly stated that the industry’s 
expansion might be hindered by food security concerns. For example, Milbrandt and 
Overend (2009) mention in their APEC analysis that ‘marginal lands’ have received an 
increased attention [sic] by the bioenergy industry as an alternative to cropland for 
feedstock supply that could help to address the food vs. fuel debate challenging the 
industry’s further development’. Cai et al. (2011) attempted to estimate marginal lands in 
Africa, China, Europe, India, South America and the continental United States and stated: 
‘[A] key constraint on our ability to expand biofuel production to reduce our dependence 
on fossil fuels is likely the limited amount of land available for producing energy crops 
and for expanding refinery and transportation infrastructure.’ Here, the emergent 
construction of ‘marginal land’ becomes remarkably useful by offering an alternative 
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land class that serves two purposes: It distinguishes land that is not cost-competitive for 
food crops (thus not necessarily ‘surplus land’), yet is still viable for energy crops, and it 
also legitimizes increased agrofuel production through expansion (as opposed to 
increasing productivity on already cultivated lands). 
When identified remotely, however, quantifying marginal land is met with many 
of the same complications that arise in assessing surplus land. The following section 
explores the challenges in distinguishing land that is both suitable and available using 
remote methods and discusses the limited application of a strictly biophysical 
characterization of marginal land in understanding how land use choices are actually 
made on the ground. 
 
2.4  A question of scale: limits to remote biophysical characterizations 
 
      2.4.1. On determining land suitability for energy crops 
 
Historically, literature featuring the concept of marginal land has spanned a variety of 
disciplines, including rural studies and political ecology. Academic contexts include 
discussions in development and environment, agricultural development and agricultural 
economics. Topics range from examining land previously favored for agriculture that has 
been beset by biophysical ‘marginalization’ (degradation) caused by land misuse/overuse 
as well as the exploration of the relationships existing between the degradation of 
vulnerable or fragile lands and poverty (CGIAR TAC 2000). 
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Marginal, as it is used in the context of the ‘global land rush’, generally refers to 
land that is arable, yet degraded or difficult to farm. This is largely determined by 
biophysical characteristics such as soil profile, temperature, rainfall and topography 
(slope). For example, the aforementioned study by Cai et al. (2011) estimates marginal 
land by categorizing land into areas of low, marginal and regular productivity based on 
the physical conditions of the land, such as a general soil rating for plant growth, land 
slope and climate. More nuanced approaches (usually building on the agro-ecological 
zone framework) recognize marginal as a relative term meaning that land must be 
established as biophysically marginal in relationship to a reference crop (or group of 
crops with essentially the same requirements). These considerations are especially 
important for studies that aim to rule out land that can be dedicated to specific food crops. 
Regardless of how marginal land is biophysically characterized, macro-scale land 
suitability assessments combine various spatial datasets of mixed resolutions – for 
example, a soil database on one scale, precipitation data on another and topography on 
still another. For the sake of tractability, the variables are then often aggregated to the 
lowest (coarsest) resolution represented in the dataset, generally yielding cells of roughly 
10 km on a side (9.3 km at the equator). This means that every point within the 100 km2 
land area will carry with it the same value for any one variable. 
 Not all studies may rely on biophysical parameters as a starting point in 
identifying marginal land suitable for agrofuels, however. For example, in a recent study 
by Field et al. (2008), the authors attempt to identify abandoned agricultural land with the 
assumption that if former farmland is no longer used for cultivation, then it is probably 
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degraded and, therefore, suitable for energy crops without directly assessing the land’s 
potential to support biomass.  
 
2.4.2. On determining land availability for energy crops  
 
Upon establishing lands of low productivity according to the aforementioned biophysical 
parameters, the availability of that land must then be assessed. Moderate resolution land 
cover data (pixel size of approximately 250 meters to one km on a side at the equator) 
and other spatial data are overlaid onto productivity results to determine how land is 
actually being used. ‘Available’ in this sense can be inferred to mean that these lands are 
not already being used to some discernible (easily quantifiable) economic end or that they 
are otherwise undesirable for agricultural development. This allows for the exclusion of 
urban landscapes, areas that are currently cultivated, and land that should not be 
developed for other reasons. Which areas constitute the latter is up to the discretion of the 
researcher and can include discounting lands deemed crucial for maintaining biodiversity 
or supporting valuable ecosystem services such as forest, wetlands and protected areas. 
Any land that is not discounted as ‘land in use’ according to land cover data is presumed 
marginal and acceptable for bioenergy crops. 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 contrast four recent studies in order to highlight the 
diverse methodologies and data sources used to estimate the amount of regional or global 
marginal land with agrofuel potential. Figure 1 illustrates the different scales on which 
data is combined to determine which lands would be both potentially suitable for 
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bioenergy crops and those that are available (i.e. not currently being used). The point here 
is to demonstrate how and the extent to which the classifications of marginal land are 
quantitatively and qualitatively divergent. Field et al. (2008) also point out the 
complications that arise with using merely two datasets to derive their marginal land 
estimate; generally speaking, the more datasets that are used, the more the uncertainty 
and the higher the likelihood of error propagation based on the original models.  
  Methodological issues aside, it is at the step when available land is distinguished 
from suitable land that the scale of the assessment becomes a limitation. Even with the 
finest resolution of remote sensing data routinely collected, land cover simply does not 
sufficiently reveal how people are interacting with their physical environment to the 
degree of specificity required to determine availability in most cases. The conflation of 
land cover and land use, although often used interchangeably, is not appropriate in this 
context, given that people often have intentions behind land use that cannot be deciphered 
remotely. 
For example, in areas categorized as grassland, it is not possible to conclude with 
certainty that the land is idle and not being used by nomadic pastoralists and for 
smallholder livestock grazing without local validation. Determining pastureland within 
grassland ecosystems is a formidable challenge for those modeling land use, a distinction 
not inconsequential considering that in Africa, an estimated 50 million pastoralists and up 
to 200 million agro-pastoralists live across the drylands that constitute 43 percent of 
Africa’s inhabited surface (IIED/SOS Sahel UK 2010). Land use may be inferred through 
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the application of proxies such as demographic data and other national statistics to 
estimate the amount of livestock present in an area, but these are inexact. 
Another issue is that although attempts are made to discount land that is already 
cultivated, pockets of cultivation may be overlooked and rolled into available marginal 
land estimates because the resolution of the land cover data is too coarse to	  detect it. 
Moderate resolution remote sensing data is generally adequate for capturing cultivated 
cropland in developed countries, where managed agricultural systems are represented in 
large blocks and easily identified. They are monocropped agricultural landscapes that 
‘green up’ at predictable times during the growing season – a phenomenon that can be 
detected through the Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI). Many countries, 
however, still have very large rural populations and farm sizes there are much smaller 
than the remotely sensed grid cell. 
For example, in Ethiopia, 64.5 percent of cultivated farms occupy less than one ha 
and 40.6 percent are on land parcels of 0.5 ha or less (Gebreselassie 2006). Even data of a 
finer resolution (30 arc second) and measuring roughly one km on a side will not 
necessarily capture many of these rural farms or communities. Many of these 
smallholders intercrop year round and/or rely on subsistence agriculture, so the growing 
and harvesting of such a small area of a particular crop may remain unaccounted for in 
assessments. To accurately assess availability for prescriptive purposes, data of a finer 
scale are required. Images of much higher resolution (1–4 meters) can be created from 
orbiting satellites such as SPOT or IKONOS, but the data is private, not routinely 
collected and thus inappropriate for using in modeling large-scale estimates. The sum of 
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these overlooked lands may not seem substantial, considering that the magnitude of 
estimated marginal land varies to the order of hundreds of millions of ha between studies, 
but it must be acknowledged that millions of people eke out a living on less favored lands 
globally, which may not be discounted from global assessments of available land for 
bioenergy crops (CGIAR TAC 2000).  
Marginal land analyses, such as the aforementioned study by Field et al. (2008), 
generate estimates of previously cultivated land that has been abandoned on the 
assumption that it has been degraded to the status of no longer favored land. To know 
that land has been abandoned, there must be a way to establish it was once used for 
agriculture. The abandoned crop area in each grid cell (five minute arc resolution) is 
calculated as the difference between the maximum crop area from the years 1700 to 2000 
and the crop area in 2000 if the difference was positive (Campbell et al. 2008, Field et al. 
2008). Since the vast majority of this time period falls before the advent of remote 
sensing technology and digital record keeping, estimates of past-cultivated land need to 
involve proxy measures – in this case, population (Goldewijk 2001). Using moderate 
resolution land cover data, previously cultivated land that had been converted to forest 
and urban areas was discounted. These were the only land cover features that were 
excluded from the estimate, which means that all other land was classified as abandoned. 
Even though the authors concede that some of the abandoned cropland in their 
assessment is probably currently used as pasture (unable to be distinguished from other 
grasslands via satellite land cover data), the very term, ‘abandoned’, carries the 
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connotation that these identified lands are both unused and available, which is not 
necessarily the case.  
Moreover, Field et al. (2008) point out that their global abandoned land estimate 
of 386 Mha is subject to the substantial measure of uncertainty of 50 percent or more. 
Despite this imprecision and the inherent challenges in estimating abandoned land on a 
macro scale, the term continues to be used. For example, in the aforementioned marginal 
lands assessment by Cai et al. (2011), the authors state that they have identified 320–702 
Mha of available marginal land if ‘only abandoned and degraded cropland and mixed 
crop and vegetation land, which are usually of low quality, are accounted’ for. 
Abandoned lands are mentioned repeatedly even though the authors state that they 
confined their methodology to using strictly biophysically based indicators of 
productivity to determine ‘marginality’ because previous estimates (including the 
assessment from Field et al. 2008 and Campbell et al. 2008) are ‘subject to uncertainty 
and incompleteness due to the data sources’ (Cai et al. 2011). 
There are cases where remote sensing can be useful in identifying abandoned 
rural landscapes; for example, a study by Baumann et al. (2011) used multi-temporal 
moderate resolution satellite imagery to detect deserted farmland in post-socialist western 
Ukraine. In specialized regional cases such as these, the results are more instructive since 
high-resolution images can be obtained to visually validate the results. Additionally, 
farmland in the study area had been previously consolidated into large blocks and was 
therefore more amenable to detection through moderate resolution satellite data. More 
insight from this study suggests that previously cultivated agricultural land classified as 
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abandoned cannot necessarily be assumed to be degraded or unsuitable for commercial 
food production. In fact, farmland abandonment was more pervasive in the Ukrainian 
plains than in the biophysically marginal areas (Baumann et al. 2011).  
 
	   25	  
Table 2.1 Comparison of marginal land classification studies and methodologies 
 
Authors Marginal Land Definition Scope 
Number of 
Spatial 
Datasets Used 
Methodology 
Cai et al. 
(2011) Marginally productive land 
Africa, China, 
South 
America, 
continental 
US 
6 
Determining Suitability Determining Availability 
Combined topography, soil 
temperature, soil class, 
precipitation, and temperature 
data to sort land into low, 
marginal and regular 
productivity areas 
Land cover classes are overlaid onto 
productivity results. Marginal 
productivity land found within various 
landcover classes are then summed 
according to varying scenarios. 
Combinations potentially include 
degraded cropland, mixed crop and 
vegetation, grassland, savanna, 
shrubland, and pastureland 
Campbell 
et al. 
(2008)/ 
Field et al. 
(2008) 
Abandoned agricultural land 
(assumed to be degraded) Global 2 
All abandoned land (i.e. 
previously used for agri-
culture based on proxy 
measures like population) is 
expressed as a fraction of ~100 
km2 grid cell and considered 
biophysically suitable 
Suitable (i.e. abandoned) land that has 
not been converted to urban area or 
forest according to land cover class is 
considered available 
Milbrandt 
& Overend 
(2009) 
Bare or herbaceous areas not 
in use or with moderately 
intensive pastoralism, lands 
with soil problems and land 
that is moderately or steeply 
sloped (8-30%) 
Asia-Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
(APEC) 
economies 
(21) 
unclear 
Combined soil, topography 
and climate data to yield low 
productivity land 
Suitable (i.e. abandoned) land that has 
not been converted to urban area or 
forest according to land cover class is 
considered available 
Nijsen et 
al. (2011) 
Abandoned agricultural land 
Degraded land Global 9 
Degraded land estimated 
through downscaling of soil 
degradation database to ~100 
km2 grid cells using variables 
from other spatial datasets of 
varying resolutions 
Grid cells corrected for land use/cover 
types assumed not to be subject to 
degradation including a certain 
percentage of closed-canopy forest, 
bare soil, urban areas, & bioreserves 
Sources: Cai et al. 2011; Nijsen et al. 2011; Milbrandt and Overend 2009; Campbell et al. 2008; Field et al. 2008	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Figure 2.1. Spatial resolutions of original datasets combined to determine suitability 
and availability of land for bioenergy crops (refer to Table 2.1 for details on 
referenced studies)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                    
Sources: Cai et al. 2011; Nijsen et al. 2011; Milbrandt and Overend 2009; Campbell et al. 2008; 
Field et al. 2008  
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2.5 Marginal land on a local scale: a socioeconomic characterization 
 
The question of availability aside, it is not always certain which agrofuel crops the land 
may support if, indeed, these less favored lands are conducive to any type of agriculture. 
Others may only support one or two types of crops, but viability does not imply 
productivity. Any ascertained potential for energy crops needs to have been determined 
with a specific crop (or crops with similar growing conditions) in mind, yet the 
biophysical conditions or thresholds conducive to successful biodiesel or second-
generation stocks have not been comprehensively researched and their productivity in 
regionally specific growing conditions not empirically tested.  
Even if a parcel of land was thought to be able to support modest agrofuel 
feedstock yields based on known or approximated biophysical parameters, it doesn’t 
necessarily mean that its conversion to agrofuel feedstock will be cost-effective. Land far 
from markets or other infrastructure would be prohibitively expensive to develop. A 2008 
study considered saline land, bare land, marshland, reed swamp and tidal flats suitable for 
bioenergy crops, though these areas might not be economically or environmentally 
feasible to develop (Yan et al. 2008). These lands and others on hillsides, prone to serious 
erosion, may constitute a significant amount of the 23 Mha of marginal land Chinese 
officials claim to be acceptable for energy crops (Naylor et al. 2007). This raises another 
doubt on the value of global assessments: If the point is to identify less favored land as a 
potential economic resource, biophysical characterizations are not sufficient to determine 
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the marginality of one parcel of land relative to another since there are other factors that 
influence land’s productivity value, which can only be determined in a local setting. 
In an economic context, marginal land is defined through the extensive margin of 
production, where revenue is just equal to costs of production (Peterson and Galbraith 
1932). Rational land use decisions will be based on and respond to changes on the 
extensive margin since it is the point at which a different land use becomes more 
profitable than the existing use (USDA 2011). This margin is determined not only by the 
characteristics of the land itself, but also influenced by technological, legal, institutional 
and macro-economic conditions. Credit accessibility, restrictive land tenure policies and 
small landholdings also play a role (CGIAR TAC 2000; Wiegmann et al. 2008). For 
example, land can become commercially competitive for food crops due to changes in 
exogenous factors (such as irrigation, infrastructure), despite being deemed marginal at 
the outset. See Borras et al. (2011a) in their analysis of land appropriated to ProCana for 
sugarcane ethanol production in the Massingir district of Mozambique; the land evidently 
considered marginal in the eyes of the state is adjacent to a rehabilitated dam that has the 
potential to change the profile of local economic opportunities in agriculture in the areas 
affected. 
Agricultural land that is ‘marginal’ is subject to frequent change as a shift in any 
one of these aforementioned factors (or an increase in the price of agrofuels) may affect 
the extensive margin of production, pushing landholders to adopt the next best 
opportunity (James 2010). Shifts in the extensive margin can also cause the movement of 
farmers from food crops into agrofuel stock on favored lands if there are no policies 
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discouraging this from happening. Thus, the ‘marginality’ of a land parcel can only be 
determined in reference to the particular economic opportunities offered by the array of 
land use choices available locally at that moment and cannot be determined by analyzing 
land suitability for a single productive use. 
Marginal lands’ quasi-permanent status may allow for a fixed inventory of 
generally ‘low productivity land’ (which may or may not be economically or 
environmentally desirable to develop), but this static characterization does nothing to 
inform the process of localized land management or to reflect how land use decisions are 
rationally made on the ground. While there is no doubt that local agricultural markets can 
be heavily impacted by external factors and often distant actors, these forces ultimately 
play out in the local context where remotely fixed categories lose their relevance in the 
face of ever-changing landscapes. 
The macro-scale framing of marginal lands may just be the expected discursive 
response to what are seen as global problems, such as, for example, ‘global land 
grabbing’, ‘global commercial pressures on land’ and ‘global warming’. It may be 
argued that results attempting to remotely identify abandoned land or create suitability 
classes based on global datasets are not intended to be prescriptive since ‘seeing like a 
satellite’ does not provide sufficient detail regarding the human environment relationship 
to make land policy and management decisions. Their main application is to create 
agricultural and natural resource baselines, enable comparative regional analysis and 
promote an enhanced level of resource literacy (IIASA 2011). Authors will often 
acknowledge limitations in global assessments pointing out that not all the estimated land 
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may be usable and that ‘trade-offs may exist between the present environmental and 
ecological value of MAL [marginal agricultural land, sic] and the potential value for 
biofuel production’ (Cai et al.2011). Caveats state that ‘final land availability will be 
affected by not only the physical feasibility factors but also global energy and food 
markets, technological innovations, social and institutional adaptations and 
accommodations, engineering infrastructural support, and resources availability’ (Cai et 
al. 2011). Nijsen et al. (2011) state that their goal is to ‘provide a rough estimate based on 
global information, and more detailed studies are needed at a local scale to evaluate these 
estimates.’ 
 Indeed, validation is always a significant concern in any remote sensing based 
analysis, especially one performed on a global scale (Zhang et al. 2006). All estimates 
also need to be refined and interpreted on a localized level if they are to serve as building 
blocks for land use planning. To this end, many platforms have been developed as 
extensions of basic land productivity assessments. Here, socioeconomic information can 
be more effectively integrated and support decision makers in performing multi-criteria 
analysis on a sub-national level. But this begs the question: If options are available to 
combine biophysical land profiles with local conditions in order to maximize utility 
across a multi-objective resource planning scenario, why exactly are macro assessments 
necessary and what is their role if they lack the descriptive power to be relevant on the 
ground? 
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2.6  Reimagining landscapes: marginal land as a ‘new’ natural resource 
Categorizing the material environment through socio-spatial ordering is an active process 
that is never value neutral. For example, when used to demarcate particular spaces, words 
such as ‘rural’ and ‘marginal’ often carry the connotation that they are supplementary in 
relation to a more dominant central core (Bryant et al. 2011). The socially and 
environmentally heterogeneous spaces that make up this composite supplementary space 
do not necessarily share any unifying characteristics or identity. Hence, they are 
distinguished more through what they are not, rather than what they are (i.e. ‘rural’ is first 
and foremost non-urban, as defined most often through population measures). ‘Marginal 
land’ is also a supplemental space, though not defined through a relationship to a physical 
core, but rather to a central ideological tenant: Land is either currently cultivated and, 
therefore, already functioning inside the capitalist, agricultural paradigm, or it is non-
commoditized and marginal – the value of the land expressed as its ability to be 
eventually folded into that paradigm. In this way, the remote classification of marginal 
lands is an extension of what Sluyter (1999) refers to in his discussions on the 
postcolonial material-conceptual landscape as the ‘binary categorization of the world into 
developed core versus underdeveloped (or developing) periphery’. The idea of ‘marginal 
land’ is an expression of selective geographical knowledge that reflects a bias toward 
resource productivism by taking disparate lands with their own distinct socio-natures and 
crafting an aggregated, static, newly minted commodity supply zone. 
Once these spaces are reinterpreted and naturalized as ‘other’, their availability 
needs to be confirmed. Macro-scale assessments are extremely effective at subsuming 
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the complexity of the human-environment relationship and creating spaces that are at 
once seemingly asocial voids, yet still have material potential. This echoes the historical 
discourse that employs the pretext of depopulation or terra nullias (no man’s land) to 
justify the colonial conquest of spaces from the depiction of ‘pristine environments’ in 
Latin America or ‘wastelands’ in Asia (Denevan 1992; Gadgil and Guha 1992 as cited in 
Bryant 2011). Africa has been the ‘continent of contradictions’, where descriptions of 
underdeveloped and sparsely populated areas are juxtaposed with descriptions of resource 
abundance, geological potential and opportunities for investment (Bridge 2001). From a 
remote perspective, unique, complex histories and ecologies are de-emphasized for the 
sake of creating dehumanized landscapes that are tabula rasa for capitalist production. 
These new ‘open spaces’ are purified through abstraction and prepared to be 
economically linked to the international commodity markets (Bridge 2001).  
It is at this point that the global and the national interface and the narrative of 
‘marginal land’ can play a normative role in the sanctioning of land allocations for 
agrofuels. Though many states may not be currently using spatial tools such as remote 
sensing and GIS for official land use planning purposes due to lack of human or 
technological resources, they have an incentive to embrace the notional and vague 
language of these mostly biophysical models as it serves to direct the attention and 
activities of investors towards the ‘new’ resource – ostensibly for the sake of spurring 
rural development. The authority of the epistemologies and methods of the geosciences 
can be evoked by developmentalist states to create non-political capital enclosures, 
which, according to Makki and Geisler (2011) in their work on development by 
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
33 
	  
	  
dispossession in Ethiopia, serve to both ‘precondition and recondition capital 
accumulation’ in the continuing process of ‘capitalist commoditization and valorization’. 
But, as Robbins (2001) reminds us, land classification is an inherently political exercise; 
it determines what is recorded as existing and can thereby influence future management 
decisions (Comber et al. 2005). For example Indian policy makers continue to promote 
meeting the Indian government’s national biofuel policy objectives through the 
cultivation of 13.4 Mha of previously classified ‘wastelands’ for Jatropha despite 
evidence that these projects are neither pro-poor nor profitable (Ariza-Montobbio 2010). 
The abstraction of satellite image analysis to classify marginal land makes it easier to 
justify capital enclosures that enable the shift from local producer priorities toward global 
exchange circulation if that is the will of the state or those that have influenced existing 
land classifications with their resource politics and priorities. 
Upon ground-truthing these so-called marginal lands, however, the integrity of 
the construct is belied by the complexities of the socio-ecological relationships that are 
revealed to exist there. For example, Borras Jr. et al. (2011b) have discovered, through 
their field work in the Philippines, that many key areas deemed by the government as 
marginal are both significantly populated and productively engaged, putting them at odds 
with official census information. In Ethiopia a report issued by the former Ministry of 
Mines and Energy (MoME) in 2007–08 asserted that 23 MHa of land is potentially 
available for agrofuel development nationally. Though the report stresses that only 
marginal land is to be used, it does not include any specifics on these earmarked lands, 
nor does it disclose the means by which they were identified (Lakew and Shiferaw 2008; 
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MoME 2007). Regional governments are responsible for passing lists of land parcels 
suitable for agrofuels to the federal level, but there are no shared criteria or methodology 
that regions adhere to in classifying these marginal areas (D. Abebe, personal 
communication, 10 August 2011). The sheer scale of the estimate raises questions about 
actual land availability. As shown in Figure 2.2, the land deemed suitable for agrofuels in 
the Ethiopian region of Gambella actually exceeds its total land area. The region of 
Oromia has approximately 17 Mha of marginal land available and, since this represents 
roughly half of its total land area, quite obviously includes woodlands, bushlands, 
grasslands, bamboo forests and pastures (Aklilu 2008). When questioned about land that 
had been recently awarded to SunBiofuels, a UK company investing in a Jatropha project 
in the regional state of Benishangul-Gumuz (BG), Ethiopian Mining and Energy officials 
called the land ‘unusable’ and said it was ‘just marginal land’. The district administrator 
responsible for the project went on to say that ‘the whole thing [sic] is nothing but 
positive’ (Knaup 2008). 
Methodological opacity when it comes to sorting out marginal versus 
nonmarginal landscapes on a national and sub-national level may be a moot point, 
however, given that many governments lack much more than general knowledge about 
domestic land ownership and land use. Many states have yet to complete proper land 
inventories, complete due process with regard to environmental impact assessments, or 
lack working knowledge of which groups may already be using land for grazing, 
subsistence farming, hunting and gathering, or other purposes. In the most comprehensive 
assessment of large-scale land acquisitions for agriculture to date, the World Bank found 
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that poor management of land information has resulted in an ‘astonishing lack of 
knowledge on behalf of land agencies and governments as to what is going on within 
their own borders’ (Deininger et al. 2011). As a result, land being considered for agrofuel 
development cannot in good faith be categorized as marginal by any stretch of the 
imagination, and if no policies (or enforced policies) exist to prevent investors from 
acquiring land for fuel crops, there would be no reason for them to direct attention 
anywhere other than fertile land in order to maximize yields. Given these circumstances, 
broad statements about marginal land availability seem dubious on this large scale and, 
with the amount of public confidence we have seen, yet remain difficult to contest as the 
term is so prone to conceptual drift. 
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Figure 2.2  Land area across six Ethiopian regions deemed suitable for agrofuels by 
the Ethiopian government compared to total regional land area 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Aklilu 2008; MME 2007; Central Statistics Authority of Ethiopia (CSA) 2007. Data 
collated by author. 
 
2.7 Concluding discussion 
 
The marginal lands narrative is assumed to have normative applications in redressing 
concerns regarding the food versus fuel question as well as the ‘land grabbing’ 
phenomenon in food insecure countries. Still, the term remains elusive as an operational 
concept that can be applied and understood from a multi-scalar perspective and recent 
efforts aiming to concretely quantify marginal land employ different definitions, diverse 
methodology and combine a multitude of data sources. Remote sensing is a useful tool in 
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generally identifying low productivity land base on biophysical attributes, but moderate 
or coarse resolution satellite data are not an appropriate framing device since marginality 
in an economic sense requires a more dynamic and nuanced characterization of all the 
socioeconomic factors that drive rural decision makers to dedicate their land to one 
particular use over another. The expression of marginal lands as ‘pregiven sociospatial 
containers’ (Bryant 2011) is of limited application when deciding which parcels of land 
would be economically desirable to dedicate to agrofuels, or even in determining whether 
particular parcels are conducive to any sort of crop production at all. 
Remote characterizations also conflate land use and land cover when determining 
land availability. Depending on the definition of ‘marginal’, certain land cover types may 
be included in marginal estimates when, indeed, they are areas that communities directly 
rely upon for medicine, building materials, fuels, subsistence farming, hunting and 
gathering, grazing, among other things. In addition, land may be considered marginal 
even though it may play an important role in maintaining the health of the ecosystems 
upon which many rural people may depend. This paper posits that since these 
assessments are a non sequitur for identifying land that is economically or socially 
marginal on the ground, the question must be raised as to the purpose of discursively 
framing this particular problematique from a remote perspective. 
 The organization and representation of landscapes through modern spatial 
analysis techniques is an active and value-laden process. Any land categorization, 
especially one as charged as ‘marginal land’, needs to be considered first and foremost as 
social artifice in order to reveal the ideological biases that may be implicit in its 
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construction. This is to encourage the critical examination of naıve representations of 
landscapes that are in reality comprised of complex socioecological relationships that 
become abstracted in the quest for establishing a new commodity supply zone. Narratives 
that homogenize and enclose spaces according to their natural resource potential 
reinforce the hegemony of consumptive economies. They are also in keeping with the 
developmentalist orientation of many states that see opportunities to reassert their 
authority in shaping how land can be rationalized and inserted into the international 
commodities market and, in this case, aligned with the interests of the bioenergy industry 
at large.  
‘Marginal land’ extends the notion of ‘surplus land’ in that it ameliorates 
reemergent Malthusian concerns over future resource scarcity and it is a narrative that 
will continue to co-evolve with increasing global commercial pressures on land. There is 
irony in the fact that the more pervasive the term, ‘marginal land’, has become in circles 
from the academic to the political, the more difficult it is to pin down. Understanding the 
current ontology of marginal land classification is essential if we are to also leave room 
for other possible interpretations of these disparate, sparsely populated, decentralized, 
rural in-between places that are biophysically deemed as ‘other’ – interpretations that 
might be more inclusive of the human environment relationship and ecosystem services 
that are currently not valued. 
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Chapter 3  
Marginal land and the ‘global land rush: a spatial exploration of contested land 
uses, development and state-building in contemporary Ethiopia 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The ‘global land rush’ or ‘global land grab’ is a term used to describe rapid change in 
land use rights and land use patterns as a result of the buying or leasing of large pieces of 
land in developing countries on behalf of state-affiliated or private investors (Borras et al. 
2011b; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula et al. 2009) While domestic and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to agriculture in developing countries is not new, the size 
and speed of land concessions for food and biofuel projects has marked the onset of a 
new phase that many believe warrants being distinguished within the longer-term 
historical processes of economic and social transformation in rural societies (Anseeuw et 
al. 2012). 
Much of the discussion on the ‘land rush’ has centered on exploring global drivers 
of the phenomenon, as well as the localized impacts of land acquisitions on the 
livelihoods and environments of rural and marginalized populations. Somewhat less 
attention has been paid to probing the activities of the states hosting land deals despite the 
fact that states play a fundamental role in facilitating land acquisitions often considering 
them an integral feature of national development policy. To meet this end, many 
developing states are not only establishing regulatory frameworks conducive to 
investment and providing investors with technical and financial support, but also using a 
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variety of methods to identify and enclose what is often customary land deemed suitable 
for investing (German et al.  2013).  
States that have set aside land in ‘land banks’ often colloquially characterize these 
areas as ‘marginal’, ‘unused’, ‘wasteland’ or ‘barren’. Since these terms are state-defined 
and land labeling and classification is inherently a political exercise (Borras 2011c; 
Comber et al. 2005; Robbins 2001), critically examining how these labels are applied in 
the context of land leasing can provide useful information regarding state priorities as 
well as the role the transformation of these areas will play in achieving state-defined 
goals. Since many countries do not make land bank or land lease locations available to 
the public, however, it is a challenge to investigate the ontological basis of these 
‘marginal/unused’ labels, identify broader counter-narratives regarding land use in these 
areas, and consider what these labels might tell us about the priorities of the state. 
This chapter explores these themes using Ethiopia as a case study. The 
government of Ethiopia has set aside millions of ‘marginal’ hectares of land in a 
federally-delineated land bank. Valuable ethnographically-grounded studies have 
illuminated the contested nature of land use in some areas (Shegro 2013b; Meckelburg 
2012; Maru 2011), but a larger scale, data driven exploration of the marginal narrative in 
the context of land leasing in Ethiopia has not been done.  
First, I use data from semi-structured interviews to unpack the ontology of the 
state’s ‘marginal’ land categorization. I targeted centrally-located1 government officials 
and employees as interviewees since they are not only key decision makers in choosing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Ethiopian	  capital,	  Addis	  Ababa	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investment land, but architects and agents of national policy initiatives in Ethiopia. I then 
triangulate several datasets to geospatially define land bank boundaries in order to 
attribute biophysical, socio-cultural and land use information to the areas contained 
within them. This enables me to corroborate and juxtapose the state’s promoted 
understanding of these areas with other land use narratives in three of the four land bank 
regions.2  Finally, I discuss the political role the marginalization of land bank areas may 
play in achieving state-building objectives and how these goals can be achieved through 
their transformation of settled agriculture 
 
3.2 The global land rush, development narratives and state-making 
 
As Wolford et al. (2013) note, much has been written about land acquisitions in the past 
five years, but a better framework for understanding the processes by which land 
acquisitions are reciprocally shaping, and being shaped by, the modern nation state is 
needed. One aspect of state participation that scholars have explored is how government 
actors categorize and label lands as ‘marginal’, ‘wasteland’, ‘unused’, etc. as a tool for 
legitimation when it comes to land leasing (Baka 2013; Brara 2012; Borras Jr. et al. 2011; 
Nalepa and Bauer 2012; Ariza-Montobbio et al. 2010).  Some argue that these labels 
work by abstracting targeted areas from their socio-ecological context in order to 
depoliticize the state’s enclosure of particular areas and frame land allocations to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Land	  bank	  areas	  in	  the	  region	  of	  Benishangul-­‐Gumuz	  are	  omitted	  from	  the	  current	  analysis	  and	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  Chapter	  4	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investors as development opportunities (Makki 2013; Abbink 2012). As Dwyer (2013) 
points out, a central framing device in discussing land deals asks us to consider them in 
the context of the polemic: ‘land grabbing or development?’ Couching land acquisitions 
in development rhetoric may work to legitimize state involvement in land leasing on a 
global stage. 
However, a comprehensive inquiry into state motivations for active engagement 
in large-scale land leasing for agriculture does not end with questions of national 
economic and social development. Narratives of development (including through land-
leasing) can seamlessly intertwine and legitimize exercises in state-building concerned 
with issues of shaky citizenship, violence in the peripheries and the reconfiguration of 
territories to favor state consolidation (Grajales 2013; Abbink 2012). These issues are 
salient in states that, like Ethiopia, initially took shape as their imperial centers engaged 
in cycles of raiding and annexation, expanding until their power became progressively 
weakened in the periphery as a function distance and geography (Clapham 2002)3. 
Governments are now challenged with forging modern, legible states by contending with 
fluid peripheries populated by ethnically diverse, often semi-nomadic groups with 
‘borderland’ identities that pose challenges to their cultural, political and economic 
integration into the ethos of the state core (Wilson and Donnan 1998:3,4). 
Specifically regarding Ethiopia, scholars of political economy have suggested that 
the Ethiopian government may be using the optics of emptiness to replace recalcitrant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  This	  trajectory	  was	  interrupted	  by	  colonialism	  in	  many	  cases.	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development sites with capitalized enclaves that have increased agricultural land rent 
potential intended to serve the macro-economic objectives of the state (Abbink 2012; 
Lavers 2012; Makki 2012; Makki and Geisler 2011). This chapter corroborates and 
expands on these works by placing these areas in a concrete geographical context looking 
at not only how transforming these specific marginal/‘unused’ areas supports the broader 
vision of Ethiopia’s macro-economic development strategy, but how it also supports 
other facets of state-building through the economic and political integration of peripheral 
areas that are currently only tenuously under state control. 
 
3.3 Ethiopia’s agricultural policy and the peripheral ‘lowlands’ 
 
Current Ethiopian agricultural policy as outlined by the EPRDF includes an emphasis on 
large-scale commercial farms cultivating cotton, date palm, tea, and rubber tree to 
produce agricultural products for export in order earn foreign exchange (Lavers 2012; 
MoFed 2010; EIA 2008). 
This brand of agricultural commercialization envisioned by the government is 
limited by the fact that much of the nation’s cultivable land is already intensively used by 
peasant farmers on small farms (<2ha) in the politically-important and densely populated 
north-central highlands of the country. For this reason, agricultural extensification is 
being envisioned predominantly for the country’s lowlands (<1500m) in what are 
considered today as considered as ‘emerging’ regions. 
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These regions are multi-ethnic, state-created territories historically characterized 
by poor administrative capacity, political marginalization and economic exploitation by 
the more established and ethnically homogenous north-central regions named for the 
ethnonyms of their cultural majority (Makki 2012; Adegehe 2009; Hagman and Mulugeta 
2008; Donham 1986). These areas are home to roughly 20% of the nation’s population 
distinctly separated geographically by a dramatic escarpment that surrounds the highland 
plateau on all sides. Livelihoods of those occupying the lowlands include pastoralism as 
well as shifting agriculture, as opposed to almost exclusively settled agriculture on the 
plateau.  
The lowland peripheries, however, have been a mulish target not only in regard to 
current development schemes, but also for the Ethiopian empire antecedent to the modern 
state as they attempted to expand their power and control away from cultural locus of the 
central highlands. Political historian John Markakis depicts this impasse borne of sharp 
contrasts between the highlands and the lowlands:  
 
The lowland periphery posed every imaginable obstruction to integration. It 
created immense obstacles to transportation and communication that have yet to 
be overcome and presented mortal hazards to the health and welfare of 
highlanders who have ventured there; as a result, very few have done so. The 
pastoralist economy did not lend itself easily to surplus extraction, while the 
peripatetic mode of life and independent ways of the herders defied efforts to 
control them. Consequently, the process of integration halted at the edge of the 
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escarpment for nearly a century and resumed only at the turn of the 21st century. 
(Markakis 2011:44) 
 
Because of these formidable barriers, the EPRDF recognized that any extensive 
lowland projects would require a considerable outlay of capital and though the 
government had committed on paper to the provision of roads and electricity, relatively 
small progress was made on these priorities. Other constraints such as frequent flooding, 
erratic rainfall, and malaria have rendered commercial agricultural expansion into 
emerging regions a speculative strategy at best. Despite efforts on behalf of the Ethiopian 
Investment Agency (EIA), MoARD and other government agencies in the form of 
promotion materials touting millions of hectares land available for agricultural 
extensification in the lowlands, almost no investor interest materialized there (MoARD 
2010; MME 2007; MoFED 2003; EIA 2008). 
 In 2009, as interest in land increased, the government created the Agricultural 
Investment Support Directorate (AISD) under the auspices of the MoARD to manage all 
land requests from foreign investors and any domestic investor interested in more than 
5,000 ha. The AISD was also invested with the responsibility of cataloging appropriate 
land parcels to be allocated to investors through the creation of the federal land bank. 
Shown in Figure 3.1, the land bank represents areas the Ethiopian government will be 
designating for investors and large-scale commercial agriculture.4   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The	  validity	  of	  geo-­‐coordinates	  is	  questionable:	  when	  mapped,	  some	  designated	  land	  areas	  overlap	  and	  occasionally	  extend	  west	  beyond	  the	  state	  borders	  into	  neighboring	  South	  Sudan.	  Polygons	  are	  adjusted	  for	  overlaps	  and	  clipped	  to	  be	  contained	  within	  the	  borders	  of	  the	  region	  to	  which	  they	  are	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Figure 3.1 Land bank coordinates in the lowlands  
 
 
Sources: MoFA 2010; CSA 2007; Gesch 2007. Data collated by author. 	  
3.4 The land bank controversy and the state narrative of ‘marginality’ 
 
The creation of a state defined land bank has been controversial for many reasons (Stebek 
2012, Rahmato 2011).  Since much of the leased land was intended for either domestic or 
foreign investors to either produce food or biofuel products for export, there is the 	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concern of food security in a country where the FAO (2010a) estimates that 
approximately 40% of the population is considered undernourished.  
With the government operating under incomplete knowledge about current land 
use in many parts of the country (especially on communal lands), concerns were also 
raised on behalf of the human rights community about how the 30% of the population 
without any formal recognition of their land use rights under the constitution would be 
affected (Stebek 2012). Studies emerged illuminating cases where locals were displaced 
to make room for private investors without recourse and without receiving compensation 
(see Human Rights Watch 2012b; Horne 2011; Fisseha 2011; Demeke and Akilu 2008). 
Lastly, Ethiopia’s government is structured on a model of ethnic federalism, and up until 
the formation of the AISD, each of the country’s nine agro-climatically diverse, 
ethnically-delineated regions autonomously allotted land to investors according to their 
own criteria. This was in an act of decentralization consistent with the central state’s 
political provision for ethnic self-determination and in keeping with regions’ 
constitutionally granted responsibility to administer land that falls within regional 
borders. Depositing regional lands in a federally administrated and managed land bank 
amounts to a partial re-centralization of the country’s land resources under the control of 
Addis Ababa authority and throws into serious question the government’s commitment to 
ethnic self-determination. 
Consequently, government representatives aimed to ameliorate at least some of 
these aforementioned concerns by describing transferred land as well as land designated 
for future allocation as ‘marginal’. Other classifications conflated by government 
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officials in reference to land allocated to investors include ‘unutilized’, ‘empty’, and 
‘barren’, among others. For example, when questioned about land that had been awarded 
to a UK company investing in a Jatropha plantation, Ethiopian Mining and Energy 
(MME) officials called the land ‘unusable’ saying it was ‘just marginal land’ (Knaup 
2008). The former MME claimed that 23.3 Mha of ‘barren’ land was available for 
biodiesel development -- an estimate which accounts for roughly one-fourth of the total 
landmass in the surveyed regions (MME 2007). Metasebia Tadesse, minister counselor at 
the Ethiopian embassy in New Delhi has said: ‘Most Ethiopians live on highlands; what 
we are giving on lease is low, barren land. Foreign farmers have to dig metres into the 
ground to get water. Local farmers don’t have the technology to do that. This is 
completely uninhabited land. There is no evacuation or dislocation of people’ 
(Chandrasekaran and Padmanabhan 2011). 
 
3.5 Unpacking the ‘marginal’ land narrative  
 
The primary objective of my semi-structured interviews with government officials was to 
investigate how these ‘marginal’ parcels in the land bank were conceived and 
categorized. I found that the concept of ‘marginality’ (used interchangeably with some of 
the aforementioned descriptors) hinges on two notional principles.  The first was that 
lands set aside for investment are considered ‘fertile’. However, this can be considered a 
general appraisal founded on general knowledge of the country’s various agro-ecological 
zones rather than a detailed assessment of land fertility based in formal methodology or 
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concrete criteria.  The second was that in addition having some sort of agricultural 
potential, government officials stress that allocated land is ‘unused’. Land that is ‘unused’ 
describes large swaths of fertile land that remains uncultivated due to socioeconomic or 
other constraints to their development. 
I used layers of geospatial information to investigate government claims regarding 
current land use in these areas. Two results emerge when I overlay this geospatial data 
with the land bank coordinates. The first is that if land bank lands are not already used for 
agriculture, nearly all these so-called marginal areas are already in use by locals for other 
purposes. Secondly, the land bank lands are located in the vicinity of major rivers where 
dams for either hydropower or irrigation (or both) are either planned or already in various 
stages of construction. This following section discusses contested land uses in land bank 
areas in Afar, SNNP, and Gambella and the relevance of these areas for national 
development plans.   
 
3.5.1 Afar 
 
Afar is one of Ethiopia’s emerging regions in which we find areas of land placed into the 
federal land bank. In 2010, the federal government claimed to have 409,678 ha of land 
suitable for agricultural investment, yet mapping the land bank coordinates published the 
same year reveal a much larger figure amounting to roughly 1.5 Mha. Even if the former 
figure represents a refined estimate of targeted land within the land bank boundaries, a 
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closer look at land use there reveals contending perceptions of land use between the 
government and the people of Afar. 
Afar has an arid to semi-arid climate and is comprised of about 9.6 Mha in the 
northeastern part of the country bordering Eritrea. Its inhospitable landscape has been 
described as  ‘torrid’; it features the highest recorded annual temperature on earth, as well 
as one of its greatest active volcanic areas at the triple junction of the Nubian, Somalian, 
and Arabian tectonic plates (Markakis 2011:46). Rainfall is erratic and droughts are 
commonplace.  
Given its geography, the majority of Afar’s land is bare with little potential for 
agriculture. The region’s most valuable land in terms of supporting agricultural 
productivity lies in the Awash River Valley-- an area populated and used by Afar 
pastoralists. The Awash River Valley offers the best resources in the region for livestock 
production in both the wet and dry seasons and is crucial to Afar livelihoods (Markakis 
2011: 45).  
Despite being used by pastoralists, the government has a major interest in taking 
advantage of the resources provided by the Awash River Valley, namely by harnessing 
the surface water provided by the Awash River and its tributaries for irrigating large-
scale agricultural schemes. The Ethiopian government is familiar with the Awash River 
Valley’s irrigation potential having already partially developed the land for schemes in 
the 1960s for commercial cotton production. This thriving industry collapsed during the 
nationalization of resources following the revolution of 1974 and these lands have since 
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fallen into disuse or have been reoccupied by local pastoralists that do not use irrigated 
agricultural methods (Awulachew et al. 2007). 
The government is again massively investing in the region and two major projects 
in various stages of completion. The objective of both projects is to irrigate land, and 
build facilities to support sugar cultivation and processing under the auspice of the 
Ethiopian Sugar Corporation (ESC), a state-run public enterprise. The newly constructed 
Tendaho dam will facilitate irrigation for sugarcane to be processed into ethanol as well 
as into sugar for export at the newly built Tendaho sugar factory.  The total area irrigated 
area is located inside the federally-delineated land bank boundary in northern Afar near 
the location of Tendaho will reach 50,000 ha when completed (ESC 2015). The Kessem 
Dam is another project currently under construction on an upstream tributary of the 
Awash River in the southernmost portion of Afar. The dam will have the capacity to 
retain 500 million cubic meters of water and will irrigate 20 thousand hectares of  
sugarcane plantations. Ten thousand hectares of the irrigated land will be given to 
planters to cultivate the cane for the factory that will be managed by ESC (Tekleberhan 
2012). The government is using land in proximity to these projects to build hundreds of 
what they call non-residential ‘service giving blocks’ as well as for constructing hundreds 
of houses for trained workers that are relocating from other sugar factories throughout the 
country (ESC 2015). 
Figure 3.2 shows where land bank areas overlap with pastoral lands along with 
various development schemes related to sugar production including new dams, reservoirs 
and sugar factories.  Pastoral spatial data was derived from livelihood zones obtained 
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from the USAID Livelihood Integration Unit in conjunction with MoARD.  Protected 
areas (wildlife reserves or National Parks) provided by the Ethiopian Wildlife 
Conservation Authority (EWCA) are also included to convey the degree of enclosure and 
resource competition between government interests and pastoralists in the area. 
 
Figure 3.2 Contested land uses in Afar 
 
Sources: National Geographic Society 2011; USAID Livelihoods Integration Unit (LIU)/MoARD 
2010; MoFA 2010; CSAb 2007; EWCA nd, MoARD nd. Data collated by author. 
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3.5.2 SNNP 
 
SNNP is another region where we find contested spaces within land bank boundaries. 
Approximately 429,000 ha are marked for large-scale agricultural investment in the 
South Omo Zone, named for the Omo River that flows from the northern highlands south 
into Lake Turkana at the Kenyan border to the south. This zone is home to the Lower 
Omo Valley where much of the land has been named a UNESCO heritage site for its 
paleo-anthropological and paleo-environmental value. The area is also renowned for its 
ethnic and linguistic diversity with eight distinct ethnic groups occupying their own 
singular niche through specialized socio-economic and ecological practices. In this 
dynamic region of micro-cultures and micro-climates, the Omo River is the lifeblood of 
the Lower Omo Valley with 200,000 people depending on its seasonal cycles to either 
directly or indirectly support their livelihoods. These include flood cultivation and fishing 
as well as collecting honey, practicing shifting cultivation, and raising livestock away 
from the tsetse infested flanks of the river. The inhabitants of the Lower Omo Valley 
rarely have permanent settlements, as they must move according to the seasonal 
resources available to them.  
In addition to being heavily used by local groups to support their livelihoods, the 
land and water resources of the South Omo Zone are of intense interest to the Ethiopian 
Government. For example, Gibe III is a dam and hydropower project under construction 
on the Omo River. The project has a planned installed capacity of 1870 mw which 
represents more than double Ethiopia’s current electricity demand (Abbink 2012). Large-
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scale irrigation plans are clearly underway downstream from Gibe III, and several blocks 
of land within the boundaries of the land bank have been set aside or have already been 
developed into large state-owned sugar plantations flanking the Omo River5. This 
includes the Kuraz project that will be comprised of six sugar factories, 245,000 ha of 
sugar cane plantations in the land bank area along the Omo, as well as housing units, and 
roads to accommodate workers and facilitate distribution (ESC 2015).  Gibe IV and V are 
future dams already on the government’s agenda that will further manipulate the Omo 
River’s flow for both hydropower and irrigation. 
Figure 3.3 overlays livelihood zones generated by the USAID Livelihood 
Integration Unit in conjunction with MoARD with land bank coordinates. This illustrates 
where land intended for agricultural development overlaps with pastoral and agro 
pastoral zones as well shows their proximity to large government infrastructure projects 
on the Omo River. As in the previous section, I include protected areas to give context 
regarding resource competition.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  A	  report	  from	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (2012b)	  maps	  an	  additional	  block	  of	  about	  123,000	  ha	  being	  developed	  for	  sugarcane	  in	  an	  area	  that	  both	  appears	  to	  be	  outside	  of	  the	  land	  bank	  boundary	  and	  severely	  encroaching	  on	  Omo	  National	  Park.	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Figure 3.3 Contested land uses in SNNP 
 
Sources: National Geographic Society 2011; USAID Livelihoods Integration Unit (LIU)/MoARD 
2010; MoFA 2010; CSA 2007; EWCA nd; MoARD nd. Data collated by author. 
 
3.5.3 Gambella  
 
Gambella is another emerging Ethiopian region with large amounts of land demarcated 
for the land bank.  Gambella borders South Sudan in the hot, sub-humid lowlands about 
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800 km southwest of Addis Ababa. Unlike most lowlands, however, its adequate rainfall 
can support a diverse array of crops. Livelihoods in Gambella include agro-pastoralism 
with subsistence crops including maize, sorghum, along with various fruits and 
vegetables.  
In Gambella, several rivers traverse the region as part of the Baro-Akobo river 
basin but very few irrigation schemes currently exist. Large-scale irrigation potential for 
the basin is estimated to be over 1 Mha for the whole basin, a large portion of which is 
found in the Gambella region itself (Awulachew et al. 2007). Recently, private foreign 
company Saudi Star has been utilizing the only large-scale irrigation scheme, a dam on 
the Alwero River, to cultivate rice for export to Saudi Arabia. 
Figure 3.1 shows almost the entire region was targeted for investment according 
to original land bank data. However, a government official at AISD remarked that the 
land bank areas had been refined to only include land classified by the ‘woodland’ land 
cover class (Interview with Respondent D). Many of these woodland regions are located 
in areas that have been identified by the Ethiopian Ministry of Water and Energy (MWE) 
as areas with high irrigation potential (MWE 2013), Gambella’s woodlands are mostly of 
the Combretum-Terminalia variety, which describes a landscape with trees that exceed 5 
meters in height and a crown tree cover greater than 20% (FAO 2010b). The Combretum-
Terminalia ecosystem plays a crucial role in terms of the services it provides to its 
inhabitants including medicinal plants and non-cultivated food plants as well as 
supporting resources for supplementary activities such as hunting, gathering and 
beekeeping (Awas et al. 2004).  
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These deciduous woodlands also comprise much of Gambella National Park 
(GNP), another contested region covering about 20% of the Gambella region’s area. The 
park was established to protect wildlife not found elsewhere in Ethiopia.  Locals continue 
to use resources inside the park; the value of provisioning services including fish, 
medicinal plants and household water has been estimated to be at least $30 million per 
annum (Schuschnigg et al. 2009). The park has never officially been gazetted and 
according to EWCA official Cherie Enawgaw, it has ‘no management plan and has no 
clear indicated boundary’ (Pearce 2011).6  This has become a concern for 
environmentalists since an estimated 438,000 ha have been granted to agri-business 
companies in close proximity to the park, along its border, or even encroaching into park 
territory. This includes two of the biggest foreign agri-business companies operating in 
the area: Karuturi Agro Products Plc. and Saudi Star Agriculture Development Plc.  
Figure 3.4 is a comparison between the government’s land cover map with an 
AISD map demarcating land for future investment. I also map EWCA coordinates for 
Gambella National Park. This shows the MoARD/AISD appears to be working off a map 
of park boundaries that looks much different than the boundaries the EWCA have 
negotiated. One can also see that in addition to woodland, land bank areas also include 
other land class types including areas classified as shrubbed grass, and bamboo forest. 
Also targeted appear to be Gambella’s wetlands-- areas that EWCA park boundaries 
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  Gambella National Park was established as a protected area in 1973 but has not yet been afforded full 
protection by the government. Its legal status is unclear. 
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protect. Other select land leases (foreign, >5000ha) that were negotiated by the federal 
government are also included to show where land has already been allocated away from 
local users.  
Figure 3.4 Contested Gambella National Park boundaries and areas for investors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source data: National Geographic Society 2011; Enawgaw 2011; MoARD 2011; CSA 2007; 
MoARD nd. Data collated by author. 
Karuturi	  Global	  	  Ltd.	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3.6. The role of the unused narrative in state building 
 
As discussed, land bank areas set aside for large scale agricultural development are 
contested spaces in terms land use.  They are also locations that have current plans or 
potential to be used for mega infrastructure projects such as dams and irrigation schemes. 
Terms such as ‘marginal’, ‘unused’, ‘barren’ or ‘wastelands’ are used interchangeably to 
describe socially and ecologically heterogeneous lowland areas that are clearly being 
used yet not being appropriated to the highest purpose in the state’s opinion: commercial 
agriculture. This begs the question: why not use more precise terms to describe these 
areas such as ‘underutilized’ or ‘underproductive’? Though these labels have been used, 
they seem to be used far less frequently (Interviews with Respondents A, D, E 2012) 
Using terms that mimic technocratic language used in land classification schemes seems 
not only misleading and vague, but also unnecessary especially since the state is quite 
bold and unapologetic when it comes to promoting and pursing its development agenda. 
Africanist and anthropologist Jon Abbink (2012) describes the EPRDF self-image as the 
‘vanguard party solely able to direct the national development effort, on the basis of a 
political model of top-down implementation and wholesale re-engineering of Ethiopian 
rural society.’ 
For example, the government has been heavily criticized for the zealous and 
somewhat stalwart approach in pursuing development projects in land bank areas and 
their vicinity despite the financial, political, and ecological risks they may incur as well 
as their massive social impacts. (Abbink 2012). As of mid-2012, no governmental social 
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or environmental impacts had been completed for the Kuraz sugar project and complete 
impact assessments for Gibe III on the Omo River (on which Kuraz project will depend 
for irrigation) only became available years after the dam construction had already 
commenced (Human Rights Watch 2012b; Velpuri and Senay 2012). The Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) under construction on the Blue Nile River in the 
Benishangul Gumuz region is a unilateral and self-funded project condemned by Egypt (a 
downstream user of Nile waters) and the relationship between the two countries is on 
precarious terms (Schwartzstein 2013, Abbink 2012.) 
The EPRDF is not receptive to critiques of its vision for development. Criticisms 
are seen as borne of ill will, of not wanting Ethiopia to ‘civilize’ and reach its goal to 
become a middle-income country (Abbink 2012; Meles 2011). Concerns from people that 
will be affected by these plans are not often heard and there is no official or public 
avenue for dialogue and airing dissenting opinions.  The people in these communities 
(and along with them their cultures and livelihoods) are treated as casualties to the 
development process and what is positioned as the greater good (Abbink 2012). 
This posturing may be an attempt to depoliticize and legitimize the EDPRF plans 
by couching its actions in global development discourse; in short, evade ‘politics’ while 
acting quintessentially political (Abbink 2012). This may very well be the motivation for 
the ‘unused’ or ‘marginal’ land labels as they conceptually (or physically) empty out 
spaces to manner to apolitically make room for social production and commodification, a 
prerequisite for what the Ethiopian state is considering development  (Makki and Geisler 
2011). The attempt to neutralize debate over their economic growth strategies that 
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involve mega-scale infrastructural projects and land leasing by using this narrative has 
obliged the Ethiopian government to engage in a contradictory discourse to continue to 
attract investment. Lands are unused but fertile, barren yet full of opportunities for 
investors.  This echoes a historical colonial discourse that is so familiar in both Africa 
and Latin America where descriptions of underdeveloped and sparsely populated areas 
are juxtaposed with descriptions of resource abundance and geological potential (Bridge 
2001). 
The rural transformation that the Ethiopian state aspires to, however, is not just 
about development. The changes that will come about as a result of the EPRDF’s growth 
and transformation plan and subsequent land leasing have massive benefits for the state 
aside from big picture economic objectives such as growing GDP or earning foreign 
exchange through increased agricultural exports. These benefits, which relate to state 
building, and the mechanisms by which they are accomplished (discussed below), will 
accrue through the political and economic integration of the peripheries into the 
hegemonic core of the state. Negative impacts on the poor and vulnerable in these areas 
may not be just an unavoidable casualty or by-product of development, but the 
smothering of their livelihoods may actually be seen as essential to in order to achieve 
aspects of state-building that Ethiopia has been aspiring to for nearly a century.  
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3.6.1 Economic integration 
 
In his 2009 work on proto-modern states in Asia, political scientist and anthropologist 
James C. Scott refers to the notion of ‘state-accessible product’ as a useful distinction 
between be the total size of the economy and the proportion of the economy that the state 
can actually appropriate. The people in the peripheral regions of Ethiopia have developed 
unique local economies that generate products that are not considered state-accessible. 
For example, settled agriculture presents a clear advantage over pastoralism for a 
state interested in capturing tax revenue. Pastoralist activities may be an important part of 
the Ethiopian economy7 but many (if not most) pastoralists in the peripheral lowlands 
such as Afar and SNNP do not sell animals commercially, but trade or use them as part of 
a subsistence economy based in short term, house-hold survival strategies. These are thus 
not governed by the market and do not produce a taxable surplus (Markakis 2011:30). 
Livestock that are sold commercially may still evade taxation due historical patterns 
shaped by geopolitics; though Eritrea’s independence in 1993 geographically separated 
the Afar from their customary trade outlets along the Red Sea Coast, old trade networks 
persist and pastoral activities in this region now largely represent illegal cross-border 
market activities that evade custom tariffs and export permits (Behnke and Kerven 2013; 
Markakis 2011:31).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Pastoralism	  provides approximately16% of national GDP and 35% of agricultural GDP (SOS Sahel 
2010; Hatfield and Davies 2006).	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Promoting state-accessible product might also explain the government’s 
preference for sugar plantations. The ESC currently runs three fully operating sugar-
processing factories in the country and the government’s goal is to expand up to 12 
factories in the coming years (ESC 2015). One of the existing factories, Metahara, is 
particularly successful due to favorable cultivating conditions for commercial sugar cane 
growers in the Middle Awash Valley. Since the government is both the combined estate 
owner of Metahara in addition to the taxing authority, the government used a variety of 
accounting devices to claim for itself 65% of the factory’s sales turnover (Behnke and 
Kerven 2013). A 2013 IIED study comparing the economic returns of pastoralism with 
sugar cane cultivation and processing in this area finds that pastoralism may make more 
economic sense but notes: “Whatever else it does, Metahara makes a lot of money for 
government” (Behnke and Kerven 2013). 
 
3.6.2 Political integration 
 
Large-scale agriculture and supporting infrastructure in the lowland peripheries provides 
the government a way to maintain a consistent presence in the far reaches of the country 
where groups often have weak allegiance to the state and engage in sporadic, yet violent, 
intergroup or interregional conflicts over power sharing, land, and economic and political 
ownership.  For example, the Afar have a complex relationship to the state and have 
historically engaged cycles of open rebellion followed by periods of  ‘sullen but silent’ 
opposition (Naty 2002). Groups in Afar society have engaged in intensely violent 
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territorial disputes with ethnic groups in the neighboring Ethiopian region of Somali for 
nearly three decades. They have been portrayed by highlanders as inhospitable, isolated 
and unapproachable and have their own insular form of conflict resolution that is not 
receptive to outside intervention, including the state (Markakis 2011:53).  On the west 
side of the country, the ethnically heterogeneous region of Gambella has been, and 
continues to be, fraught with violent conflict. The Anuak, the historic ethnic majority, 
have been reduced to the minority due to the steady infiltration of Nuer from Southern 
Sudan. The Nuer are looking to expand their territory and conflicts frequently arise not 
only with the Anuak, but between the Nuer that have recently been fleeing war-torn 
Southern Sudan and the Nuer that are already settled in Gambella (Meckelburg 2012). 
The Anuak also harbor grievances with highlanders that have settled in the region that 
have, and continue to erupt resulting in violent clashes.   
There are also added elements of tension and volatility in land bank areas since 
most of them are located along or near international borders. The border between Afar 
and Eritrea in the north continues to be disputed with the relationship between the two 
countries teetering on the brink of war for many years. In the south, violence continues to 
erupt on the borders of SNNP and Kenya as agro-pastoralists find themselves competing 
over dwindling resources threatened by ‘development’ (Branch and Mosley 2014).  More 
violence is likely as independent scientific assessments predict the Gibe III dam and 
irrigation schemes to have potentially ‘Aral Sea disaster’ level impacts on the Lake 
Turkana ecosystem located downstream on the Omo on the Kenyan border (Avery 2012). 
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3.7 Mechanisms for integrating the periphery  
 
There are several mechanisms by which large-scale commercial agriculture helps settle 
the periphery and thus expand state control in areas that have thus far been difficult to 
fold into the political and cultural ethos of the center.  
The first mechanism is pacification through the active reorganization of rural 
class structure that may result from land-leasing. Due to state incentives and legal 
restrictions imposed on local farmers, investors in land bank areas are mostly private 
foreign businesses, domestic elites or returning diaspora with weak connections to the 
communities they are investing in (Lavers 2012). Once these areas are irrigated and/or 
have access to electricity from large hydropower projects, this will further raise lease 
prices and put land out of the average farmer’s financial reach. This produces an elite 
class of commercial farmers that is primarily obliged to the state for support and 
discourages class differentiation among local farmers with deep community ties that may 
foment into political power and challenge state interests (Lavers 2012).  
The Ethiopian government may also settle the periphery through indirect routes 
such as simply squeezing rural people off communal lands by tacitly co-opting or altering 
resources that rural people need to survive, eventually extinguishing their way of life. For 
example, the capacity of pastoralism to support human populations depends directly on 
continued access to river valley lands (Behnke and Kerven 2013). In both SNNP and 
Afar, these essential river valley lands are precisely the areas designated for irrigation and 
commercial agricultural development. Transformations associated with the commercial 
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cultivation of 150,000 ha in the Awash River basin have already restricted pastoralist 
mobility and their use of dry and wet grazing areas which are especially essential during 
times of drought (Helland 2006 as cited in Makki 2012). The opportunity cost of 
rangeland to each hectare of irrigated land would not be one to one, but 3 un-irrigable 
hectares would be lost through resource access constraints resulting in the loss of 4 ha 
worth of pastoral revenue for every hectare irrigated for commercial purposes (Hatfield 
and Davies 2006). What’s more, less energy in the form of net primary production will be 
available for livestock as commercialization and sedentarization continues to grow.   
The last mechanism involved in the settling of the lowlands may be through the 
contentious ‘villigization and resettlement’ program. This is a historical form of social 
engineering Ethiopia has employed sporadically since the 1960s that served a dual state-
building function. First, the government claimed that by concentrating populations 
scattered throughout the countryside into villages, the state could better provide services 
(Daie 2012). Second, peasants could be more easily conscribed and monitored for 
political dissent and rebellion (Naty 2002; Scott 1998: 249).  
Though most attempts at resettlement have negative consequences on both the 
health of settlers and the environment and nearly all have failed their inhabitants as 
human communities (Woube 2005; Kloos 2002; Scott 1998: 250; Kinsey and Binswanger 
1993), ‘resettlement and villigization’ continues to be a popular rural development 
strategy with the government currently attempting to resettle 1.5 million people in 
Gambella, Afar, Somali, and BG (Daie 2012). Though the government denies a 
connection, interviews with local residents and prior local officials reveal that many 
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believe the current program is more of a ‘clearance program’ to rid free areas for large-
scale agricultural development (Shegro 2013a; Human Rights Watch 2012a; Rahmato 
2011). Gambella’s official villigization plan states that habitants targeted for relocation 
are currently either living or using land along ‘the riverside’ (Gambella Peoples’ National 
Regional State 2002). Areas flanking Gambella’s rivers also happen to be the areas that 
will increase in value if dams or irrigation schemes are put in place. 
Once people are removed from their homes, they are functioning outside the 
ecological contexts where they have place specific knowledge and also divested of their 
social networks. In the past, this has contributed to ‘political emasculation’ while at the 
same time causing the farmer to become more dependent on the government (Scott 1998: 
249). Though today villagers are being located within their own region instead of moved 
from highland to lowland, similar dynamics seem to be emerging. For example as Daie 
(2012) mentions in his analysis of the current the current government villagization 
scheme in BG, the most serious consequence has been ‘the disintegration of the long 
existed and strong social chains and interactions, and destruction of cultural institutions’.  
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I examined state-labeled ‘marginal’/’unused’ lands in the context of the 
global land rush in contemporary Ethiopia. Nearly all these areas have counter-narratives 
regarding land use and are located in lowland, peripheral areas of the country where 
Ethiopia has major dam projects and irrigation schemes planned that will increase the 
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economic value of adjacent lands. The land bank and the attendant ‘marginal/unused’ 
land narrative serves a dual purpose: it recentralizes control over lands the state deems 
crucial to national development while benefitting both politically and economically from 
settling intractable peripheries through land-leasing. I use a variety of geospatial 
information to repopulate areas that have been abstracted and depoliticized through state 
labels and their use in promoting national development policy. Through this process, I 
reveal the tension that faces many developing states: aspirational movements toward 
democracy and agency on one hand, and the need to reconcile precarious territories 
within state boundaries that may pose a threat to state stability, thwart its power, or at the 
very least, represent a nuisance to realizing its particular vision of modernity. In Ethiopia, 
this tension is articulated through the struggle to do justice to its model of ethnic 
federalism (regional self-determination), while navigating what it finally sees as an 
opportunity to entrench its presence in areas that have been only tenuously in the state’s 
grasp.  
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Chapter 4  	  
Marginal land or marginal people? Determinants of lands set aside by the Ethiopian 
government for large-scale agricultural investment in the region of Benishangul-
Gumuz  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The ‘global land rush’ (or ‘global land grab’) is an umbrella term that has been used to 
describe increased interest on behalf of state-affiliated or private foreign and domestic 
investors in acquiring large parcels of land in developing countries to cultivate 
agricultural products mainly for export (Borras et al. 2011b, von Braun and Meinzen-
Dick 2009, Cotula et al. 2009). Developing states hosting these deals are often 
intermediaries in the process of land appropriation or leasing (Hall 2011). These states 
play a role in facilitating land acquisitions by establishing regulatory frameworks 
conducive to investment and providing investors with technical and financial support 
(German et al 2013).  Several central governments including Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia are also involved directly in the land allocation 
process by creating land banks specifically targeting land deemed  ‘suitable’ for large-
scale agricultural projects (German et al.  2013). 
These large-scale projects have become a major source of interest and contention 
in academia, the media, as well as policy and activist organizations due to the threat they 
pose to local food security and livelihoods of the world’s rural poor. Some studies have 
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found that land acquisitions often encroach into local population’s prime agricultural 
lands and investor interest is often directed to the best land in terms of water availability, 
irrigation potential, soil fertility, proximity to markets or availability of infrastructure 
(Cotula 2012). There is also anecdotal evidence that governments may be targeting areas 
where local marginalized groups are using land in a way that is deemed not to be in the 
best interest of the state (Baka 2013; Lavers 2012; Borras et al. 2011a; Borras et al. 
2011c). 
Investigating these claims has been challenging due to a lack of specific 
geospatial information on targeted areas. Previous research on the quality of allocated 
lands and the people that are (or will be) impacted by land acquisitions and the role that 
these deals play in the broader policy objectives of the state have been almost exclusively 
addressed through intensive qualitative field studies. In this paper, I aim to fill this gap by 
using spatially-explicit information to link areas targeted for inclusion in federal land 
banks to the biophysical and socio-political characteristics that define them. My analysis 
involves a case study of the Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State 
(BGRS) where nearly 20% of the total land area has been dedicated to large-scale 
investments. I combine data from a spatially-explicit land bank map, biophysical 
landscape attributes, socio-political characteristics, and semi-structured interviews in a 
statistical model that identifies the key predictors for land allocated to the federal land 
bank in BGRS. My goal is to generate a deeper understanding of the decision processes 
underlying large-scale land acquisitions. 
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4.2 Background on Ethiopia’s federal ‘land bank’ 
 
Ethiopia is at the forefront of land leasing in Africa despite being one of the most food 
insecure countries in the world. Agriculture remains a cornerstone for the country’s 
growth with 85% of Ethiopia’s population involved in small-scale, subsistence 
agriculture (Tamrat 2010). While continuing to consider support to these farmers 
paramount for transitioning the country as a whole out of poverty, the government, 
represented by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front EPRDF, has 
broadened its core agricultural policy to include the expansion of large-scale commercial 
agriculture relying on foreign direct investment (Lavers 2012; MoFed 2003). 
 To meet this end, the government expects to lease up to 3.6 million hectares 
(Mha) to produce food and biofuel crops mainly for export (Rahmato  2011). In 2009, the 
government created the Agricultural Investment Support Directorate (AISD) under the 
auspice of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) to facilitate 
large-scale land leases to domestic investors interested in over 5,000 ha as well as all 
leases to foreign interests. AISD is also tasked with identifying large parcels of what they 
interchangeably refer to as ‘marginal’, ‘wasteland’, ‘barren’ or ‘unused’ land in the 
lowland, periphery of the country for future investment and placing them in a land bank 
to be administered by the federal government. This is significant because, although the 
Ethiopian Constitution claims that the right to ownership of all land (and attendant 
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natural resources) is exclusively vested in the state8, the government is based on a model 
of ethnic federalism that grants each of its nine regions the right to autonomously 
administer land within their territories. The creation of the land bank is essentially a 
recentralization of land resources seemingly incongruous with values represented by 
Ethiopia’s brand of federalism including ethnic self-determination and decentralization. 
The characteristics of land allocated to the federal land bank have not been 
systematically investigated despite raising important questions regarding the Ethiopian 
government’s commitment to the protection and growth of its the rural population. For 
example, the development of areas into large-scale agriculture for investors may result in 
local populations facing challenges in gaining access to good land. This refers not only to 
characteristics of the land having to do with soil quality, for example, but also to land that 
becomes more valuable as the government and investors improve infrastructure such as 
large-scale irrigation schemes and roads. This may leave local groups with less and 
poorer quality land for their own agricultural uses.  Additionally, rural inhabitants may 
also be divested from other natural resources and ecosystem services crucial to their 
livelihoods such as the case if investors are directed to forested areas that support hunting 
and gathering and provide building materials for locals, or riverbanks which support 
flood cultivation and provide pasture for livestock in the dry season.  
Scholars have also raised concerns that the government is deliberately targeting 
areas that represent a hindrance to national development in the eyes of the state (Makki 
2013; Lavers 2012; Makki and Geisler 2011). Federal land bank areas overlap with land 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE), 2005, Article 40(3).	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used by pastoralists as well as those practicing shifting cultivation, two land uses that 
have been continually dismissed as inefficient, unsustainable, and subsequently under 
supported by the central government (Lavers 2012). For example, former Prime Minister 
Meles Zenawi (2011) made it well known that he considered pastoral and agropastoral 
areas as ‘backward in terms of civilization’.  Some scholars have argued that the 
government is taking advantage of investor interest in order to promote land uses that are 
tractable to the state’s most powerful economic and political interests which include 
settled agriculture (Lavers 2012; Makki and Geiser 2011). 
 
4.3  Study area of Benishangul-Gumuz Regional State (BGRS) 
 
  4.3.1 Geography, natural features, and land cover 
 
BGRS is one of nine ethnically-delineated regions codified by the 1995 Ethiopian 
Constitution. It covers approximately 50,700 km2 in the northwestern part of Ethiopia and 
shares borders with three Ethiopian regions (Gambella, Oromia and Amhara) as well as 
an international boundary with Sudan to the west. The Abay River (Blue Nile) runs 
northwestward through the region, and joins the White Nile near Khartoum, Sudan, 
before flowing through Egypt on its course to the Mediterranean Sea. The Abay and Baro 
Akobo are two major river basins in BGRS and several of the rivers in these basins have 
significant large-scale irrigation potential (MWE 2013). Altitude ranges from 580 meters 
above sea level (masl) in areas bordering Sudan to 2,731 masl further to the east. 
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Lowlands (<1500 masl), midlands, (1,500-2,500 masl) and highlands (>2,500 masl) 
comprise 75%, 24% and 1%, of the region’s land respectively. A unimodal rainy season 
lasts roughly from May to October bringing an average rainfall of 800 to 2000 mm 
depending on altitude. Temperatures range from an average of 20C to 25C in the rainy 
season rising to 35C or 40C in the dry season. 
Land cover throughout the region consists mostly of herbaceous understory of 
graminoids (grasses) with tree and shrub cover ranging from 10-60%. Denser tree and 
shrub cover generally corresponds with elevations over 1,000 masl found in the region’s 
southeast, small areas in the central midland and highland agroecological zones, and the 
region’s far southwestern tip where BGRS borders Gambella. Common tree species 
include eucalyptus and bamboo, rubber trees, incense and gum trees, oak, and acacia. 
 
4.3.2 People and land use 
 
BGRS is extremely remote and underdeveloped. According to a Benishangul-Gumuz 
Regional Food Security Strategy report (BGRFSSR), it is also one of the poorest and 
most food insecure regions in the country (BGRFSSR 2004). Despite the increased 
building of roads, navigation remains difficult with many roads nonfunctional in the rainy 
season. The Abay River cleaves the region into northern and southern territories and until 
recently, there was no vehicle bridge to travel between them. 
In 2013, the Ethiopian Central Statistics Authority (CSA) projected that over 1 
million people would be living in the region by 2017 with roughly 80% living in rural 
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areas (CSA 2013). Small towns are scattered throughout the region with an average 
population of 27,500.  The regional capital of Asossa (pop. ~11,000 in the urban center, 
~46,000 total) is located 671 km west of Addis Ababa.  The ethnic groups that are 
considered indigenous to the region include Berta/Benishangul  (25.9%), Gumuz 
(21.11%), Shinasha/Boro (7.59%), Mao (1.9%) and Komo (0.96%). Non-indigenous 
peoples comprise 42.53% of the population. 
The ethnicization of territory under federalism has led to a tendency for exclusive 
control of territory by the titular ethnic groups and particularly, whichever ethnic group 
happens to be favored by the central party at the time (Adegehe 2009). For example, 
when the region was originally created, the EPRDF supported the Berta political elite but 
their influence has since been reduced and replaced by an alliance between the Gumuz 
and Shinasha elite (Adegehe 2009). The non-indigenous people that live in BGRS are 
mostly highlanders that the prior regime relocated to the area during the 1984 famine. 
Historically underrepresented, they have only recently gained political rights to be 
represented at the zonal, regional and national level. 
Agricultural management systems include both permanent farming systems, 
practiced most commonly (but not exclusively) by highlanders and shifting cultivation 
systems. Alternatively referred to as swidden or slash-and-burn agriculture, shifting 
cultivation involves cultivating one plot until productivity declines and then moving onto 
another to let the original plot recover fertility before re-cultivating it. Fields are 
generally prepared by hand digging with hoes or plowing with oxen.  All crops are rain-
fed and include sorghum, maize, pulses, sesame, and groundnuts. Though farmers also 
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own cattle, sheep, poultry, goats and donkeys, livestock rearing is seriously hampered by 
disease and parasites and a large percentage of animals die each year (Tuklu et al. 2011). 
More than half of the food grown is consumed by the household and is supplemented 
with foraged and hunted food, livestock products and purchases. 
 
4.3.3 Large-scale agricultural investment in BGRS 
 
Geospatial information demarcating federal land bank boundaries in BGRS (Figure 4.1) 
indicates that land dedicated to large-scale investment amounts to approximately 931,336 
ha distributed across 88 of the region’s 437 kebeles (sub-districts). Federal officials 
initially identified land bank areas from the MoARD secretariat in Addis Ababa and 
followed up with a scouting team to personally survey the chosen land and refine banked 
areas. Local levels of government were neither involved in choosing land for the bank, 
nor informed when parcels within the bank were subsequently allocated for large-scale 
and/or foreign investment (Interview with Respondent B 2012).  
Previous field studies examining the impact of large-scale land leases in BGRS 
document mostly negative impacts on the local communities (Shegro 2013b; Maru 2012; 
Desta 2014). Displacement, loss of livelihood and conflict has resulted due to overlaps 
with land currently being farmed or used by local people as well as with land leased on 
behalf of the regional government (Shegro 2013a, Maru 2012). Investors are not obliged 
to complete environmental assessments and land deals are contributing to the degradation 
of valuable forest resources already impacted by encroachment, fires, poorly defined land 
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use policy, effects from intensive state resettlement programs, overgrazing and invasive 
species (Desta 2014; Shegro 2013b; BGRFSSRS 2004;). In addition, locals do not seem 
to be benefitting as much as promised from investment in the area as many of the jobs go 
to workers from other areas of the country due to ethnic discrimination and beliefs that 
locals have poor work ethics (Shegro 2013a; Shegro 2013b; Maru 2011). 
 
Figure 4.1: Land bank areas for large-scale agricultural investment in BGRS 
 
 
                     Source: MoARD 2012; CSA 2007; Data collated by author. 
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4.4 Materials and methods  
 
            4.4.1 Conceptual model 
 
Figure 4.2 shows my conceptual model of land bank determinants. This model 
synthesizes information gathered from semi-structured interviews conducted in 2013 with 
Ethiopian government officials and other land management professionals on site in Addis 
Ababa and Bahir Dar, recent studies situating ‘land grabs’ in the larger Ethiopian political 
economy, existing ethnographically grounded research, and government documents 
detailing current agricultural policy objectives in Ethiopia as discussed in Section 2.  
First, I hypothesize biophysical properties such as soil nutrient availability will 
impact the likelihood that land is banked since good quality soil would pose an advantage 
in economic rent compared to the rest of the region increasing the attractiveness of land 
to potential investors. I also expect land bank areas to feature slopes amenable to 
mechanization as well as large-scale irrigation potential since both would be favorable for 
large-scale, commercialized agriculture.  
Based on my interview data, federal government representatives claim banked 
areas are chosen because they are ‘sparsely populated’. In my model I test both 
population and land cover variables to test these claims. Government policy documents 
and promotional materials also claim that they are specifically targeting ‘lowlands’ for 
agricultural expansion (MoARD 2003, MoARD 2010) thus I expect to find land bank 
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parcels predominantly in state-defined Major Agro-Ecological Zones (MAEZ) where 
temperature and moisture regimes are consistent with lower elevations.  
I also test socio-cultural variables I hypothesize are influencing government 
decision-making when it comes to setting aside land for investment in the land bank. I 
anticipate government bias toward permanent farming systems leads to areas inhabited by 
those practicing shifting cultivation being targeted more often. I also expect that political 
bias is contributing to which land is deposited in the bank. That is, the government may 
be targeting land belonging to ethnic groups or non-indigenous highlanders that are less 
favored by the state when compared to the Gumuz, Shinasha, Mao and Komo people, 
with some having less political representation (hence power) at the regional level to seek 
recourse or protest land policies.   
Lastly, I explore the spatial dimension of land bank appropriation. I clearly 
observe that land bank parcels are spatially clustered, but I aim to statistically explore the 
impact of both kebele size and the influence of neighboring kebeles’ land bank status. I 
anticipate that the government will favor both larger as well as contiguous land parcels 
since the government plans to invest in infrastructure in these areas (and hopes investors 
will do the same) and that larger, connected land parcels will be conducive to economic 
efficiencies benefitting the government and creating economies of scale for the investor. 
Though lower transportation costs or access to markets have previously been 
shown to influence land rents and rural producers’ decisions to organically convert to 
large-scale agriculture in situ (Serneels and Lambin 2001), I do not include these 
variables for several reasons. First, road density is highly correlated with population and I 
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believe population to be a better predictor of banked lands. Second, government officials 
operate with full knowledge that many areas in the region lack infrastructure and are 
engaging in heavy public investment for road-building initiatives. Finally, MoARD 
officials also have expectations that future investors will contribute to improving 
transportation networks meaning a lack thereof would not necessarily constitute a 
deterrent to choosing one area or another for investment. 
 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual model 
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4.4.2 Data 
 
4.4.2.1  Dependent variable  
 
Percentage of kebele dedicated to land bank:  
As the smallest administrative units, kebeles are organized on a socio-political basis and 
are instrumental to sustaining state authority and party control at a grassroots level 
(Keller 1991: 233). Every effort is made to install party loyalists as kebele leaders (Shinn 
and Ofcansky  2013: 243). I obtained kebele boundary data from the CSA (2007). The 
437 irregularly shaped kebeles of BGRS range in size from 58 to 246,954 ha with an 
average size of 11,602 ha (116 km2). I omitted kebeles identified as ‘airfield’ and 
‘military camp’. I also omitted kebeles where the majority of the land will either soon be 
flooded by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) reservoir on the Abay River 
and/or rendered unusable due to the fact that it falls into the government’s 5km buffer 
zone around the portion of the river near the dam as an effort to control malaria 
transmission. In total, 422 kebeles were included in the analysis. I also obtained vector 
polygons for areas delineated for agricultural investment obtained from MoARD. I 
calculated the percent of kebele land dedicated to the land bank by dividing the polygon 
land bank area by the total land area in the kebele.  
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4.4.2.2  Independent variables  
 
Major Agro-Ecological Zones (MAEZ): 
The 32 Major Agro-ecological Zones (MAEZ) mapped to a 1:1,000,000 scale were 
obtained from MoARD. MoARD categorizes MAEZs according to combination of 
factors affecting biomass potential. These include the length of growing period (in days 
per annum) calculated using rainfall, potential evapotranspiration and soil moisture 
storage capacity. Thermal zones were classified based on elevation. The eight MAEZs 
found in BGRS were combined into two categories with kebeles coded 0 for hot to warm 
moist/sub-humid lowlands and 1 for tepid to cool moist/sub-humid mid highlands based 
on majority status. The former are categorized by a growing period of 121-240 days per 
year, a mean temperature of 21- 27C +, and an average rainfall of 1000-2000mm. The 
cooler MAEZs are characterized by growing period similar to that found in the warmer 
zones but with a mean temperature of 11-21C and generally less rainfall measuring 
between 900-1200 mm annually.  
Slope:  
Average slope values for each kebele were calculated using ArcGIS and derived from  
the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Global 30 Arc-Second Elevation Dataset 
(GTOPO30). GTOPO30 is a global digital elevation model (DEM) with a horizontal grid 
spacing of 30-arc seconds (~1km resolution).  
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Irrigation Potential: 
I identified areas with large-scale irrigation potential through digitizing a map produced 
by the government’s Ministry of Water and Energy (MWE 2013). In this study, MWE 
documented potential irrigation sites in each of Ethiopia’s watersheds. I classified each 
kebele as having irrigation potential or not based on kebele majority status. 
Soil Nutrient Availability:  
The measure of soil nutrient availability is generated by the Harmonized World Soil 
Database (HWSD V 1.2) and considers soil texture, organic carbon, pH, and total 
exchangeable bases (Ca, Mg, and Na, etc.) (Fischer et al 2008).  Original HWSD data 
were generated at 30 arc-second (~1km) resolution and are available in 10km grid cells. 
From these data, I created two categories: land with no to slight constraint for agriculture, 
and land with moderate to severe restraint. Kebeles were assigned to one of these 
categories based on majority land area status. 
Neighbor:  
Each kebele with banked land was assigned a value representing the average percentage 
of the banked land of its direct neighbors.  
Size:  Kebele	  size	  is	  calculated	  from	  geospatial	  data	  provided	  from	  the	  CSA	  (2007).	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Population Density 
Populated estimates are based on WorldPop’s AfriPop (Linard et al. 2010) project 
estimating persons per pixel at  ~100m spatial resolution. The kebele population was 
divided by kebele area in km2 to yield population density. 
Land Use/Land Cover:  
Land use/land cover raster data were derived from GlobCover, a program of the 
European Space Agency (ESA) and a network of international partners. ESA’s global 
land cover classification system is derived from a time series of surface reflectance 
composites for the year 2005/2006 and 2009 with a 300m spatial resolution. The 
dominant land cover categories in BG include only 5 of the 22 global classes: 1) Mosaic 
of cropland (50-70%) and vegetation including grassland/shrubland/forest (20-50%) 2) 
mosaic of vegetation including grassland/shrubland/forest (50-70%) and cropland (20-
50%) 3) open broadleaved deciduous forest/woodland (>5m); 4) mosaic forest or 
shrubland (50-70%) and grassland (20-50%) 5) closed to open shrubland (<5m thicket). 
Mosaic categories that included croplands (1,2 above) were combined as were forest and 
majority forest categories (3,4). Shrubland was left as its own category. Kebeles were 
assigned a category based on majority land area. 
Agricultural Practice: 
I categorize kebeles into those with populations predominantly practicing shifting 
agriculture and those practicing permanent farming using the proxy measure of number 
of oxen per household. This measure was based on survey data from Tuklu et al. (2012) 
finding that permanent farming in BGRS is characterized by higher numbers of oxen than 
	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  
85 
	  
	  
those practicing shifting agriculture. I digitized spatial data regarding oxen ownership 
from An Atlas of Ethiopian Livelihoods co-created by USAID/MoARD (2010) with 
Food and Economy Group to assign each kebele a category coded 0 for permanent 
farming or 1 for shifting agriculture (SC) based on majority status. 
Political Power: 
I created three categories to represent political power based on a combination of 
historical representation in the regional government and the status of the political 
relationships between the EPRDF in Addis and the various ethnic groups of BGRS.  The 
Gumuz, Shinasha, and Mao/Komo (coded as MSMK) are combined into one group being 
both well represented in the regional parliament relative to the number of kebeles in 
which they are the majority as well as being favored in regional political posts by the 
EPRDF. The Berta comprise the next category being well represented at the regional 
level but less favored by the EPRDF in administrative and political appointments. And 
lastly, the highlanders from Oromo and Amhara (coded OromoAmh) are grouped based 
on their relative absence in the political landscape due to the fact that they are not 
considered groups ethnic to BGRS. I developed a proxy measure of ethnic and non-
indigenous groups through a vector language map produced by the World Language 
Mapping System Version 3.01 mapped at a 1:1,000,00 scale. 
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Table 4.1 Variables and coding
Variables Type 
 
Unit/Code 
 
 
Dependent Variable:  
 
  
 
Percentage of kebele deposited in land bank 
 
Continuous  
  
% 
Independent Variables: 
 
  
Agricultural practice  Binary 0= Permanent farming system, 1=Shifting cultivation  
 
MAEZ 
 
 Binary 
 
0= Lowland zones, 1= Mid-highland zones 
 
Political power 
        GSMK 
        Berta 
        OromoAmh 
 
  
 Binary 
 
0-1 (coded as dummy variables) 
Neighbor  Continuous % 
 
Land cover 
        Forest 
        Cropland 
        Shrub 
 
 
Binary 
  
0-1 (coded as dummy variables) 
 
Soil nutrient availability Binary 0- no to slight constraint, 1= moderate/severe constraint 
 
Large-scale irrigation potential Binary  0= no, 1=yes 
 
Slope 
 
 
Continuous 
 
Degrees 
Size Continuous km2 
 
Population density Continuous Persons/ km2 86	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4.4.3 Statistical analysis  
 
         4.4.3.1 Fractional regression models 
 
I am interested in determining the relationship between various explanatory variables and 
my dependent variable, the proportion of kebele land allocated to the federal land bank 
for investment in large-scale agriculture. For my analysis, I use a non-linear fractional 
regression model originally proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and expanded by 
Ramalho, Ramalho and Murteira (2011). Fractional regression models are appropriate for 
continuously measured proportions with a finite number of boundary observations (i.e. 0s 
and 1s) to ensure predicted values of the dependent variable are restricted to the unit 
interval (Ramalho et al. 2011). 
The simplest approach for dealing with fractional response data is to choose a 
non-linear functional form such that the conditional mean of the response variable is 
limited to the appropriate range: 
 E(y|x)  =  G(xθ)           (1) 
 
where 0 ≤ G(·) ≤ 1.  Potential functional forms include logit, probit, loglog, among 
others. These models can be consistently estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood 
(QML) based on the Bernoulli log-likelihood function (Papke and Wooldridge 1996): 
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LLi(θ)  =  yi  log[G(xθ)]  +  (1-­‐  yi)  log[1  -­‐  G(xθ)]       (2) 
 
In many applications such as mine, the dependent variable is characterized by a 
large number of observations clustering at 0.  In my case, for example, only 88 of the 422 
kebeles included in the analysis currently feature banked land. This type of clustering of 
the outcome variable at 0 indicates that it may be more appropriate to model the decision 
process in two parts where the first part results from a discrete choice selection process 
(banked land = yes/no) and the second part results from a continuous process (percentage 
of kebele land banked).  The first part of the decision process is modeled using a binary 
choice model on the entire set of observations and the second part is modeled as a 
fractional regression model as described above using only those observations with 
positive outcome values (Ramalho et al. 2011).  
The binary choice model (part one) is the probability of observing a non-zero 
outcome. Quantitatively described in Ramalho et al. (2011):  
!∗ = 01 for  ! = 0                for  !   ∈ (0,1)        (3) 
 
Then, 
 Pr !∗ = 1 ! = ! !∗ ! = !(!!!!)      (4) 
where β1P is a vector of variable coefficients and F(·) is the distribution function. Using 
the whole sample, the model is then estimated using maximum likelihood (using an oim 
estimator of the covariance matrix). 
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The fractional model (part two) then governs the magnitude of positive outcomes. 
Quantitatively described:  
 ! !|!, ! ∈ (0,1) = !(!!!!)	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (5) 
 
 
The fractional component of the two-part models is estimated by Bernoulli-based quasi-
maximum likelihood (using by default a robust estimator of the covariance matrix). 
 
Thus all together, the fractional two-part model can be described as:  
 !|! =   ! !|!,! ∈ (0,1) ∙ Pr ! ∈ (0,1)|! =   ! !!!! ∙   ! !!!! 	   	   (6) 
 
 
4.4.3.2   Model tests 
 
The propriety of applying a two-part fractional regression model depends on the nature of 
the zeros in the outcome variable. Based on the land selection method for BGRS 
described by government officials (see Section 4.3.3), I hypothesize that the process 
governing whether land in a particular kebele is selected for the bank differs from the 
process that determines the fraction of the kebele that is ultimately banked. I test this 
supposition by applying the P test statistic described by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) 
to compare a one-part fractional regression model [equation (1)] against a two-part model 
[equation (6)]. 
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4.4.3.3   Marginal effects 
 
The coefficients directly estimated from non-linear models cannot be interpreted as easily 
as those from linear models where the coefficients are slope parameters. And, more 
importantly, what I really want are marginal effects (also called partial effects) which 
measure the effect on the dependent variable resulting from a one unit increase in the 
independent variable.  For a one-part fractional regression model: 
 !"(!|!)!"! = !"(!")!"!          (7) 
 
For a two-part fractional regression model: 
 
 !"(!|!)!"! = !" !!!!!"! ! !!!! +! !!!! !" !!!!!"!     (8) 
 
I use the ‘frm’ package of STATA routines developed by Joaquim J.S. Ramalho 
for all my statistical analyses (Ramalho 2014). 
 
4.5 Results  
 
Here I report on results from a two-part fractional regression model utilizing a logit 
functional form for each part. Test results from the P-test (p<0.000) indicate a two-part 
decision process is more appropriate for my data. I tested several functional forms 
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including logit, probit, loglog and cloglog for both parts of the two-part model. All 
models performed equally well with the one exception being loglog which did not 
perform as well as the others for either part of the model. I selected the logit specification 
based on convenience as it is the default functional form in the frm package. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show results from the binary choice model. In regard to 
determinants grouped as land quality variables in my conceptual model, soil nutrient 
availability is a significant determinant in guiding the government’s initial choice to bank 
lands (yes/no) in any given kebele. It is also one of the most important factors when 
compared with the impact of other variables on the probability of being banked; soils 
with no to slight constraints related to nutrient availability are favored over those that are 
characterized by moderate to severe constraints.  
Population density is also a significant factor in the choice model corroborating 
officials’ claims that they are seeking ‘sparsely populated lands’ to target for 
extensification.  In addition to soil nutrient availability, this is one of the most important 
factors influencing the probability that the government will bank land in the kebele. The 
magnitude of this effect is most likely due to the low population density throughout the 
region (only a small sample of kebeles have a population density over 1).   
  Kebele size also appears to be important in the initial selection. This may result 
out of a preference for future investment projects to fall under the jurisdiction of a single 
kebele potentially reducing transaction costs and making any potential land management 
issues relevant to both investors and local government easier to manage. Kebele 
boundaries also occasionally coincide with geographical features and if the government is 
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operating with this knowledge, they might anticipate that boundaries may limit any 
available parcel size or the potential for mechanization.   
In terms of sociopolitical variables, my results from the binary choice model 
indicate that kebeles in which the majority of the inhabitants are practicing shifting 
cultivation are more likely to be selected than those kebeles characterized by permanent 
farming systems. Since the ethnic groups were coded as dummy variables, results 
indicate that the most powerful ethnic groups are less likely to be targeted than the Berta 
and the highlanders when they combined as the reference group. The Berta are most 
likely to be targeted. This result may suggest that even though the highlanders have less 
political power and representation in the regional government, there is a loose association 
between permanent farming systems and highlanders at the federal level that may deter 
the government from targeting these kebeles.  
Results for the fractional regression component of the model are presented in 
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and represent the most important factors in determining how much of 
a kebele the government chooses to bank once it is initially selected. At this stage, I 
added the independent variable of ‘neighbor’. I reason that once kebeles are chosen for 
investment according to other characteristics, the fraction of land set aside within its 
boundaries could increase farming efficiency and have a positive impact on how much 
land was banked in its direct neighbors. My results indicate that this is, indeed, a 
significant influence on the amount of kebele land the government banks. In terms of 
land quality, MAEZ and average kebele slope are both negative and significant; a kebele 
zoned in the mid-highlands will have less land banked than one falling into a lowland 
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zone and as average kebele slope rises, the percentage of kebele bank decreases. Lastly, 
according to my results, kebeles I classify as majority forest will have more land banked 
than those classified as cropland or shrubland.  
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Table 4.2   Determinants on likelihood of land bank selection 
  
Log likelihood =    -122.713                                                                R2-type measure=   .4520 
                          
 
Shifting 
agriculture  
 
.932028 .381826 2.44 .0.015 .183664 1.6804 
 
Soil nutrient 
availability 
 
-2.42151 .455387 -5.32 0.000 -3.3141 -1.52897 
 
Irrigation 
potential 
 
-.732511 .648914 -1.13 .0.259 -2.00436 .539338 
 
Size 
 
.000029 .000010 2.81 0.005  8.81e-06 .000049 
 
Population 
density 
 
-10.5153 2.35949 -4.46 0.000 -15.1398 -5.89076 
 
Cropland 
 
.51173010 .455390 1.12 0.261 -.380819 1.40428 
 
Forest 
 
.589386 .446520 1.32 0.187 -.285778 1.46455 
 
GSMK 
 
-1.28682 .498906 -2.58 0.010 -2.26465 -.308990 
Berta 1.392824 .447638 3.11 0.002 .515470 2.27018 
Average slope -.051817 .089309 -0.58 0.562 -.226860 .12322 
 
MAEZ 
 
-.629529 .56090 -1.12 0.262 -1.72886 .46981 
Constant 1.40268 .663993 2.11 0.035 .101280 2.70409 
 
 
 
      
 
Variable 
 
    Coefficient 
 
 EIM Standard        
Error 
 
 
      Z 
 
      P> |z| 
 
        [95% Conf. Interval] 
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Table 4.3   Marginal effects of determinants on likelihood of selection for land bank 
 
                          
 
Shifting 
agriculture  
 
       .085013           .033554 2.53      0.011      .019249   .150777 
 
Soil nutrient 
availability 
 
-.220871 .035055 -6.30 0.000 -.289589 -.152157 
 
Irrigation 
potential 
 
-.066814 .058860 -1.14 0.256 -.182178 .048550 
 
Size 
 
2.66e-06 8.98e-07 2.96 0.003 8.96e-07 4.42e-06 
 
Population 
density 
 
-.95912 .199247 -4.81 0.000 -1.3496 -.568608 
 
Cropland 
 
.046676 .041424 1.13 0.260 -.034513 .127865 
 
Forest 
 
.053759 .040335 1.33 0.183 -.025295 .132816 
 
GSMK 
 
-.117374 .044168 -2.66 .008 -.203940 -.030807 
Berta .127043 .038722 3.28 .001 .051149 .202937 
Average slope -.004727 .008125 -0.58 0.561 -.020651 .011198 
 
MAEZ 
 
-.057421 .051070 -1.12 .261 -.157516 .042674 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
        dy/dx 
 
Delta-Method 
Standard Error 
 
 
      Z 
 
      P> |z| 
 
        [95% Conf. Interval] 
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Table 4.4   Determinants on percentage of kebele banked 
 
Log pseudolikelihood =  -36.4440                                                          R2-type measure=   .6704 
 
Shifting 
agriculture  
 
     .219952          . 211272 1.04 0. 298 -.194133 .63408 
 
Soil nutrient 
availability 
 
-.104112  .158040 -0.66 0.510 -.413865 .205641 
 
Irrigation 
potential 
 
-.063509 .202816 -0.31 0.754 -.461019 .334005 
 
Size 
 
2.34e-06 1.96e-06 1.20 0.232 -1.50e-06 6.19e-06 
 
Population 
density 
 
-2.14649 1.17358 -1.83 0.067 -4.44667 .153691 
 
Cropland 
 
.130040 .261279 0.50 0.619 -.382057 .642147 
 
Forest 
 
.410177 .172593 2.38 0.017 .071902 .748452 
 
GSMK 
 
-.219700  .310694 -0.71 0.479 -.828650 .389251 
Berta .383219 .252479 1.52 0.129 -.111630 .878068 
Average slope -.270715 .05937 -4.56 0.000 -.387078 -.154352 
 
MAEZ 
 
-.541149 .245483 -2.20 0.027 -1.02229 -.060010 
Neighbor .019177  .005411 3.54 0.000 .008573 .029781 
Constant -.562218 .389294 -1.44 0.149 -1.3252 .200784 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
EIM Standard        
Error 
 
 
      Z 
 
      P> |z| 
 
        [95% Conf. Interval] 
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Table 4.5   Marginal effects determining percentage of kebele banked 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
      dy/dx 
 
Delta-method 
Standard Error 
 
 
     
      Z 
 
      
     P> |z| 
 
       
     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
 
 
 
Shifting 
agriculture  
 
 .044946          .043017 1.04 0.296 -.039367 .129258 
 
Soil nutrient 
availability 
 
-.021274 .032217 -0.66 0.509 -.084419 .041870 
 
Irrigation 
potential 
 
-.012977 .041483 -0.31 0.754 -.094283 .068329 
 
Size 
 
4.79e-07 3.99e-07 1.20 0.230 -3.04e-07 1.26e-06 
 
Population 
density 
 
-.438620 .237532 -1.85 0.065 -.904173 .026934 
 
Cropland 
 
.026573 .053221 0.50 0.618 -.077738 .130884 
 
Forest 
 
.083817 .034629 2.42 0.016 .015945 .151689 
 
GSMK 
 
-.044894 .063603 -0.71 0.480 -.169553 .079765 
Berta .0783079 .051150 1.53 0.126 -.021944 .178560 
Average slope -.055319 .011634 -4.75 0.000 -.078121 -.032516 
 
MAEZ 
 
-.110580 .050762 -2.18 0.029 -.210072 -.011087 
Neighbor .003919 .001063 3.69 0.000 .001835 .006003 
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4.6 Discussion  
 
 
In summary, my results suggest that in BGRS, the state is aiming to primarily develop 
forested land in sparsely populated lowlands. Targeted lands are also characterized by 
good quality soil and are amenable in various ways to large-scale mechanized farming. 
The transformation envisioned for these areas will potentially impact the livelihoods and 
health of BGRS inhabitants as well as the ecosystems they depend on.  
First, areas remaining uncultivated by permanent agricultural systems with the 
better soil nutrient availability will be going to foreign or non-local investors. Though 
absolute land scarcity in BGRS is not currently a problem (nor is it a problem in many 
other land bank areas in Ethiopia), this is likely to change. Ethiopia’s mostly rural 
population is set to double by 2050 and farmers in the north-central highlands are already 
facing land scarcity due to erosion and competition while average plot sizes continue to 
shrink. This could increase the already steady stream of highlanders moving to the 
peripheral lowlands looking for work and land-- a phenomenon that, along with the 
allotment of land for large-scale land acquisitions, is already causing conflict in some 
places. This pressure may push people practicing shifting agriculture to more steeply 
sloped and ecologically fragile lands with poor productivity prospects. Land degradation, 
increased food insecurity, and the further encroachment on forestland seem inevitable as 
a consequence.   
The transformation of the targeted areas also has profound health implications. 
The development of lowland zones has historically been severely hindered by the 
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presence of health risks such as Trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) transmitted by the 
tsetse fly and malaria among other diseases. These threats will need to be addressed 
especially in the case of malaria where highlanders coming to work on and live adjacent 
to large-scale farms have no endemic protection. The GERD and its reservoir could also 
have impacts on the local ecology in ways that may favor the longevity of the malaria 
parasite, increasing disease prevalence in workers and local people settled in the vicinity.  
Through large-scale land leasing, central state planners in Ethiopia appear to be 
moving toward their goal of agricultural expansion into areas where resources have been 
historically difficult for the state to harness. Government representatives are 
simultaneously exercising pressure on those that continue to practice shifting agriculture 
despite the long-standing state bias against them. Future investor success in these areas is 
dubious, however; malaria, erratic rainfall, and considerable resistance on behalf of local 
populations may mediate project outcomes.   
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Chapter 5  
Summary and future directions 	  
5.1 Summary 
 
This dissertation moves us toward a more comprehensive understanding of how 
‘marginal’ is defined and applied in our search to identify lands that are ostensibly 
suitable for large-scale agriculture, yet do not threaten the lives and livelihoods of the 
vulnerable and ill-protected. Overall, I re-politicize the process of categorizing land that 
is labeled ‘marginal’, ‘wasteland’, ‘unused’ etc. and discursively repopulate places that 
are effectively emptied (intentionally or unintentionally) of human-environment 
dynamics in order to reframe them as a potential resource.  
In the first chapter, I address the research question: how are geospatial 
technologies being used to identify marginal land suitable for biofuel development on a 
global or regional scale? I investigate the ontology of the marginal land label as it is 
applied on a global/regional scale using a qualitative meta-analysis of four recent studies 
using remote sensing and geospatial data to identify marginal lands suitable and available 
for biofuel development. I find that these studies are limited in their use in determining 
land availability. I also find that the methods for identifying them are qualitatively and 
quantitatively divergent.  In the second chapter, I address the question: how is the notion 
of marginal land conceptualized and applied in Ethiopia in the context of a ‘global land 
rush’ and what role does it play in state-making?  To answer this question, I triangulate 
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newly available geospatial information regarding Ethiopia’s federal ‘land bank’ with 
information from semi-structured interviews with government officials. I find that nearly 
all these banked lands intended for large- scale agricultural investment are contested 
spaces while the federal government stands to incur multiple benefits through their 
transformation to large-scale agriculture. In the final chapter, I ask the question: what are 
the determinants of federal land bank lands on a subnational scale in the region of 
Benishangul-Gumuz, Ethiopia? I find that soil nutrient availability, kebele size, kebele 
population, and socio-political factors (i.e., ethnicity, agricultural practices) guide the 
federal government’s decision regarding which land to target for future investment in the 
region of Benishangul-Gumuz. The amount of land set aside in neighboring kebeles as 
well as the average slope are both significant factors in terms of determinants influencing 
how much of the kebele to set aside for future investment once it is selected for the land 
bank. The government will also set aside more land in any given kebele with a majority 
land cover of forest as opposed to those kebeles classified as majority shrubland or 
cropland. Lastly, those kebeles classified as mid-highland agro-ecological zones will 
have more land set aside than those kebles residing in lowland zones.  
  
5.2 Future directions 
 
Although the conclusions drawn in this thesis are specific to Ethiopia and not 
necessarily applicable to other developing states where the federal government is leasing 
or conceding lands for large-scale investments, my methods are widely applicable. It may 
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be impossible to geo reference individual land leases/concessions for the purpose of a 
broader analysis in many parts of the world, but there are states that are currently creating 
and marketing land banks for future investment where geo-coordinates are discoverable. 
The challenges and attendant cautions in interpreting results (especially for the 
subnational analysis) are associated with the quality and availability of socio-political and 
economic data that is either non-existent and needed to be measured by proxy, or is 
available only on a coarse-level (and most likely outdated). Direct complements or follow 
ups to my research could include an exercise in participatory counter-mapping in areas 
set aside for investment or examining and characterizing human impact in these spaces 
on a per pixel basis using crowd sourcing with Google Earth. 
The type of spatially oriented and interdisciplinary work as exemplified in my 
thesis can play an important role in helping us discursively analyze motivations at the 
state-level and link them to historical and geopolitical patterns within the country. This 
potentially illuminates any systematic discrimination against (or prioritizing of) particular 
land use types or peoples in a way that intensive, place-based case studies cannot. The 
most urgent need for this research, however, has to do with establishing baselines from 
which to monitor social and ecological change. Massive changes are already taking 
place—for example, as this thesis was completed, the Gibe III dam reservoir on the Omo 
River in southern Ethiopia began to fill marking the onset of drastic alternations in the 
surrounding ecosystems and the day to day lives of millions that depend on both the river 
and Lake Turkana downstream. Establishing baselines by identifying lands that are 
earmarked for large-scale agricultural transformation sets the stage for more field 
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intensive studies regarding impacts on livelihoods and changing rural class structures as 
well as potentially linking areas under transformation to large-scale agriculture in a 
regional or multi-national study to study impacts on carbon balance or biodiversity.  
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APPENDIX I 
Interview respondents 	  
Respondent Organization Location Date conducted 
 
A 
 
AISD, MoARD Addis Ababa 1/8/2013 
 
B 
 
Bahir Dar University Bahir Dar 1/15/2013 
C 
Amhara Bureau of 
Environmental Protection 
Land Administration and 
Use (BoEPLUA) 
Bahir Dar 1/17/2013 
 
D 
 
AISD, MoARD Addis Ababa 1/10/2013 
 
E 
 
MWE Addis Ababa 1/18/2013 
 
F 
 
 
 
Organization for the 
Rehabilitation of Amhara 
(ORDA) 
Bahir Dar 1/15/2013 
G 
Addis Ababa University 
(AAU) Addis Ababa 1/10/2013 
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